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EXPERIENCE AND SOLIPSISM 
ABSTRACT
We begin by noting that the thesis that experience is never of 
material objects but is rather of sense-data does, when coupled with 
certain plausible enough empiricist theses regarding knowledge and sense, 
seem to lead to dramatic solipsistic challenges to common belief about 
the world.
After clarifying key concepts such as those of experience, sense- 
data, material objects and sensibilia we argue that the arguments for 
the specific sense-data thesis themselves require that the thesis be 
reconciled with the substance of common belief about the world, e.g.
'(2) that there are material objects etc. However, we argue that the two
principal sorts of attempt at such reconciliation, representative 
realism and phenomenalism, are far from immediately convincing.
On the other hand, however, we remain unconvinced by Wittgenstein’s 
’private language argument’, the point of which seems to be to establish 
that experience could not be of private objects such as sense-data. 
Neither do we find Strawson’s treatment of persons the bullwark against 
solipsism which it may at first appear.
In view of the difficulty into which the general thesis that 
experience is never of material objects leads us we give the arguments 
normally adduced in favour of this thesis a more thorough examination.
Our main concern here is not just to establish that this thesis is 
mistaken but to discover precisely where and how mistakes may have been 
made. 7/e identify errors in all the arguments and so continue to 
maintain a position of ’direct surface realism’, i.e. the position that 
our experience is largely of the surfaces of material objects. In this 
way vie find that we are not committed to the sense-data thesis and can, 
consequently, avoid the solipsistic positions into which we seemed to be 
forced by the thesis if we also accepted the empiricist theses of 
knowledge and sense.
O
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oPART I
CHAPTER I OUR PROBLEM INDICATED
It will help us to get a clear view of our problem if we start by 
noting a number of quite common beliefs about the nature of the world 
and our experience of it. It is, for example, commonly believed that 
there are, in the world, large numbers of objects which occupy three- 
dimensional space. Such objects are generally described as 'material 
objects’. It is also commonly believed by people that, whatever else 
they may be aware of, a large part of their experience is experience of 
these material objects. It may be more precise to say that people 
believe themselves to be aware of the surfaces of material objects. It 
is also commonly believed by people that they are not alone and that 
large numbers of the material objects of which they are aware are also 
objects of which other people are aware.
We can now note a number of initially plausible reflections which 
seem to lead to positions which challenge the common sorts of belief 
which we have just indicated. The sorts of challenge with which we 
shall be concerned might be generally termed 'solipsisms'. For the 
moment, all we need mean by calling a view a solipsism is that the view 
(2) claims that the self is, or might be, in some way, alone. It will be
possible for us to distinguish three principal sorts of solipsism.
The reflection out of which our first sort of solipsism arises 
concerns the thought that a person can only have his experiences. He 
cannot, logically cannot, have any other person's experiences. It seems, 
then, that he has some sort of immediate evidence for the belief that he 
is conscious or has a mind which he necessarily lacks in the case of 
others. The solipsistic doubt then arises with regard to the existence 
of others as conscious beings or minds at all. We can call this
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’sceptical other minds’ solipsism. The claim here is that one cannot 
know if there are other minds. This can he distinguished from 
dogmatic other minds solipsism which would claim that there definitely 
were no other minds. It is hard, however, to find any plausible 
arguments which support this dogmatic position although it may be that 
some forms of mental illness involve the patient in such a belief. It 
is also easy to imagine some rather fantastic circumstances in which 
someone might, quite reasonably, come to the conclusion that there were 
no other minds and that he was alone. For example, the sole survivor of 
a nuclear holocaust might have quite good reason to think that all 
conscious life except his own had been eradicated and that he was alone. 
The commonest way to try to avoid sceptical other minds solipsism Is to 
try to infer from the similarity which holds between the behaviour of 
one’s own body and the behaviour of other bodies that they too must be 
related to a conscious subject or be conscious in very much the same 
way that oneself is. Eiis move, however, like the one which originally 
got us into the sceptical position, has been very widely criticised.
We need not go into these criticisms here for this area of other minds 
solipsism will not be a concern of the present dissertation. All we 
(2) need to note here, in the interests of clarity, is that other minds
solipsism appears prima facie to be quite compatible with the common 
beliefs about material objects which we indicated above, i.e. that there 
are such objects and that they provide objects of awareness.
The other two forms of solipsism are, however, more radical. ?/hat 
we shall call ’epistemological solipsism* denies that anything can be 
known about the external world, including material objects, while what 
we shall call ’metaphysical solipsism’ even denies that there is any 
sense to talk or thought of an ’external world'. These forms of
o3
solipsism rest on three initially plausible theses, the sense-data 
thesis, an empiricist thesis of knowledge and an empiricist thesis of 
sense, —
It is concluded from certain reflections concerning hallucinations, 
the relativity of experience and the causal nature of experience etc. 
that a person cannot, after all, be aware, or at least immediately 
aware, of material objects as commonly believed but only of some other 
sort of thing which is private, transient and, in some way, mind- 
dependent. 7/e can call these other sorts of object ’sense-data’ and 
the thesis that experience is limited to such objects, the ’sense-data 
thesis’. It is worth noting that this use of ’sense-data’ is not that 
of Moore where he leaves it open as to whether it will turn out that 
sense-data, as he defines them, are identical with the surfaces of 
material objects or not^^^. Precisely why the reflections indicated 
above lead people to adopt the sense-data thesis is a matter to which 
we must return.
The empiricist thesis of knowledge holds that knowledge is limited 
by experience and the empiricist thesis of sense holds that sense, 
whether that of talk or thought, is similarly limited by experience.
^2) Now, of course, there is a way of interpreting these theses which makes
them seem quite implausible. For, surely, we normally suppose that 
there are a great number of things which, while we have never actually 
experienced them, we can talk and think about both knowledgeably and 
with sense. For example, I have never been more than a few feet below 
the surface of the sea but it still seems that, probably partly on the 
basis of such experiences as I have had, I can talk and think 
reasonably knowledgeably and sensibly about deep-sea diving. But the 
suggestion that it may be on the basis of the limited experiences which
(I) See 18, p. 54.
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we do have that our knowledge of and sensible reflections on other 
things hints at a way of interpreting our theses which does seem quite 
plausible. For it does seem that any knowledge or sensible thought of 
the world which people may have is based on experiences which they have 
had and that in the absence of any relevant experience at all knowledge 
and sensible thought would be impossible. For is it not frequently 
remarked that whenever people have tried to think about heaven, i.e. 
something of which they have absolutely no experience, they find 
themselves forced back on experiences which they have had? We need not 
here only think of the Renaissance artist’s paintings of clouds and 
people with wings playing harps etc. but can also think of the more 
mystical experiences which some people have claimed. It should be made 
clear that we do not have any very radical form of empiricism in mind 
here. We do not, for example, have in mind the radical, positivistic 
empiricism of the moment where the objects of present experience provide 
the limits of knowledge and sense. We allow the objects of past 
experience and indeed we also allow items of a strictly non-empirical 
nature which nevertheless seem forced on us by the form of experience, 
e.g. a pure subject. On the other hand it is worth noting that if we 
(2) reject outright any form of empiricist thesis of knowledge or sense it
becomes hard to see why there should be any limits to knowledge or sense 
at all. VJhy should vie not have knowledge and be able to think with 
sense about all sorts of things which lie beyond our experience? The 
essential point here really is not that experience per se provides the 
limits of knowledge and sense but rather that the type of experience 
provides such limits. That is to say, if experience is exclusively 
composed of sense-data then knowledge and sense will be limited to 
sense-data, both actual and possible, except, perhaps, for items of a
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purely logical nature forced on us by the form of experience. However, 
knowledge and sense could not extend to material objects which would be 
of a type of which we had absolutely no experience. We shall not 
examine these empiricist theses of knowledge and sense further but take 
it, for the purposes of the present dissertation, that, roughly stated 
as they have been, there is some essential core of truth to them'' '.
It is, then, this rather plausible interpretation of the empiricist 
thesis of knowledge which, when coupled with the sense-data thesis, seems 
to lead to epistemological solipsism where we could not know anything of 
any external world beyond sense-data. We call this 'epistemological 
solipsism’ for it amounts to the claim that ’for all I know I might be 
alone’. Similarly, it is this rather plausible interpretation of the 
empiricist thesis of sense which, when coupled with the sense-data 
thesis, seems to lead to metaphysical solipsism. For the metaphysical 
solipsist argues that since his experience is limited to private objects 
of the sense-data type he has absolutely no relevant experience on which 
he can base sensible thought or talk about things ’beyond’ these objects. 
No matter how many such objects he has access to he still has nothing 
which enables him to make the qualitative jump from sensible and 
2 2  coherent thought about sense-data, actual and possible, to sensible and
coherent thought about things of which he has absolutely no experience.
He concludes, ’The world, in the only way in which I can attach any 
genuine sense to such a notion, is limited to me and the fleeting, 
private and mind-dependent sense-data of which I am or could be conscious; 
beyond this simply lies nonsense. The world is mine, it depends on me 
and I am alone, eyen to speculate on ’’others” is to fall into nonsense’.
It is important to note that the metaphysical solipsist is not merely 
denying the existence of an external world beyond his private sense-data
(l) For a methodological justification of this see below p. 8.
oexperience but is denying sense to thought of such a world, i.e. the 
world of common belief which we indicated at the beginning of this 
dissertation. Whether the conclusions of the epistemological solipsist 
and the metaphysical solipsist are justified or even coherent are 
issues to which we must return.
We are, however, already in a position to make a number of 
observations of a fairly general sort. First, we can note the general 
character of our problem. We started by indicating a few very common 
beliefs about the nature of the world and our experience of it but now, 
after just a little reflection on what seemed initially plausible 
enough views, we seem to have been led to a number of different, though 
related, sorts of challenge to the original common beliefs. First it 
seemed that we could not be as certain of other minds as we could be of 
our own. Second it seemed that we are never aware, or at least 
immediately aware, of material objects, as commonly believed, but rather 
of sense-data which are held to be private, transient and mind-dependent. 
We noted that this sense-data thesis, v/hen coupled with our empiricist 
thesis of knowledge, prompted the thought that we could know nothing of 
the external world at all. Finally if we coupled the sense-data thesis 
2 2  with our empiricist thesis of sense we seemed to be led to the conclusion
that the common beliefs with which we began were not simply false but 
lacking in sense. We started then with a number of views, none of which 
seemed conspicuously implausible, and yet when we try to trace out the 
implications of these views various sorts of contradiction seem to arise. 
In possessing this character our problems are not untypical of most, if 
not all, philosophical problems.
Second, we can note the strong empiricist thread which runs through 
the various sorts of solipsism just noted. It is, after all, the
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thought that only I can have my experiences which prompts other minds 
solipsism. It is the notions that knowledge is limited by experience 
and that experience is limited to sense-data which prompt epistemological 
solipsism. Finally, it is the notions that sense is limited by 
experience and that experience is limited to sense-data which prompt 
metaphysical solipsism.
Third, we should note that so far we have made considerable use of 
the word 'seems*. We have said that it seems as if the sense-data 
thesis, when coupled with certain other theses, leads to positions 
which challenge our common beliefs. This is quite deliberate for, of 
course, there are many philosophers who will deny that the sense-data 
thesis does, in any serious way, lead to such challenges. I have in 
.mind here, in particular, the representative realist and the 
phenomenalist. The representative realist claims that, although 
experience is of sense-data, we can infer, quite legitimately, from 
these sense-data quite a lot about the external world and the material 
objects which occupy it. The phenomenalist, on the other hand, treats 
the external world, not as something which has to be infered from 
sense-data but as something which is reducible, in some way, to sense- 
2 2  data. We have, then, left the issue of whether the sense-data thesis
really does lead to such challenges quite open for the moment. For, 
while I think that we shall find reason to suppose that the sense-data 
thesis really does lead to such challenges, it would, perhaps, not be 
altogether fair to jump to this conclusion without at least some 
discussion. Consequently, we shall spend a little time in the second 
part of this dissertation in discussion of the theories of the 
representative realist and the phenomenalist as well as some of their 
variations.
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Finally, here, we can outline a strategy for dealing with our 
problem, V/e have already accepted that the representative realist and 
phenomenalist should be given a chance to reconcile the sense-data 
thesis with the common beliefs which we originally indicated. However, 
let us assume, for the moment, that this reconciliation is not effected. 
It would then seem that we must have gone wrong in our reasoning 
somewhere and our first task would be to decide where we should start 
looking to discover where and how we have gone wrong. Our common beliefs 
are, I suggest, to be sacrificed only as a last resort. This leaves the 
sense-data thesis and our empiricist theses of knowledge and sense. It 
might be felt that there is not all that much to choose between them as 
far as initial plausibility goes. However, we can note that if we start 
with the sense-data thesis and find it mistaken then both epistemological 
and metaphysical solipsism fall. However, it seems that if we begin with 
our empiricist thesis of sense and find it mistaken then while 
metaphysical solipsism would fall epistemological solipsism would not.
On the other hand it would seem we could not disprove our empiricist 
thesis of knowledge unless we had first disproved our empiricist thesis 
of sense. For how could one have knowledge in the absence of sense. If 
2 2  we are, then, looking for a start it seems that the wise policy to adopt
is to start with the sense-data thesis and try to kill two birds v/ith 
one stone. We shall, however, try, not just to show that the sense-data 
thesis is mistaken but precisely how and where this mistaken thesis has 
arisen. Before any of this, however, we must try to get a little 
clearer about some of the key concepts with which we will be involved.
So far we have made extensive use of the terms 'experience', 'sense-data* 
and 'material object' with only the very roughest of indications 
regarding what we take to be their reference. Our immediate task, then, 
will be one of conceptual clarification.
oPART 2,. BACKGROUND SCENERY 9
CHAPTER 2 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS 
Experience
The word ’experience’ is in such general use, both in ordinary life
as well as in philosophy, that, unless we are careful to say precisely
what we mean by it, it can scarcely fail to give rise to confusion. If,
in ordinary life, a person tells us that his experience of life has led
him to the conclusion that honesty is always the best policty then it
seems fairly clear that here the word ’experience’ is intended to include
a rich and complex fabric of individual judgements with regard to the
telling of lies on particular occasions and the telling of truth on
particular occasions. This sort of use of the term ’experience’ to refer
to something which includes some element of judgement or conceptualization
is also common enough in philosophy. This is especially true of the
Kantian literature where to experience something, in a Kantian way, would
seem to be to experience something as a such and such, i.e. as falling
under some concept or other. This use of ’experience' is clearly
described by Professor Strawson v/hen he writes as follows. 'Concepts
which enter into our basic or least theoretical beliefs, into our
fundamental judgements, are just those concepts which enter most intimately
2 2  and immediately into our common experience of the world. They are what
- special training apart - we experience the world as exemplifying, what
we see things and situations as cases of. Correlatively, experience is
awareness of the world as exemplifying them. We should not say that
judgements at this level are made on the basis of experience. Rather we
should say that at this level judgement, concept and experience are
(l)merged; that seeing and believing really are, at this level, one'^
7/e might also just note here that the word 'perceive' is also frequently 
used in a similar fashion to refer to something which involves some
(I) See 27, pp. 14-5.
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degree of judgement or conceptualization.
Yet, at other times, though less frequently these days, people may
use the term 'experience' with a notion of some sort of crude, totally
unconceptualized data in mind. 'Experience', on this view, refers to
what we have of the 'given', i.e. that which provides the objects of
conceptualization or judgement but hot to something which includes any
element of conceptualization or judgement; as Strawson would say, the
'basis' for judgements. Indeed, it would seem that 'experience', in our
first sense, must include 'experience', in this, our second sense, i.e.
it must include some given. That the word 'experience' can be legitimately
used in this narrower way to refer to that which we have of the given
seems to be accepted even in Strawson's description of 'experience' in
its broader more inclusive sense. For there he talks of this broader
experience as that in which 'judgement, concept and experience are 
(l)merged'\ And yet there are a few who would resist this distinction 
between the given and the judgements etc. which we make with regard to it.
It might go some way towards appeasing those people if we note at 
once that when we claim that there is such a distinction to be made we 
need not be claiming that it is psychologically possible for anyone to 
2 2  have an unconceptualized experience, i.e. to have experience, in our
second narrovrer sense, of the given without forming some sort of judgement 
on it. Neither does the claim that there is a distinction to be made 
between the given and the conceptualizations we make with regard to it 
mean that the given, by itself, would be of any use to us. It might 
indeed be nothing but James's 'blooming, buzzing confusion' but, of course, 
it would not even be recognized as such without an element of 
conceptualization, for to think.of something as a blooming,'buzzing 
confusion is itself to apply concepts lo. that thing.. „In,this,connection
(l) My italics.
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it is worth noting that even to see the world in focus requires a 
contribution from the person involved, in the focusing of his eyes etc., 
which might be loosely described as ’conceptual'. We might still claim, 
however, that there is a distinction to be drawn between the given, poor 
thing though it may be, and conceptualization and judgement. For it is 
when people want to say that I actively, by focusing my eyes, create the 
sharp edges of material objects etc. that we feel, with justice, that 
things have gone too far.
It is just possible to discern another hazy thought lurking behind 
the general unwillingness to admit the distinction between the given and 
conceptualization. It has however, at least to my knowledge, never been 
explicitly stated and we shall see that once it is it turns out to be 
quite confused. The thought might be put as follows. It is impossible 
to even conceive of an unconceptualized given for to conceive of such a 
thing would, ipso facto, be to conceptualize it. We can, therefore, make 
no use of the notion of an unconceptualized given in our reasoning. The 
essential point in the thought seems to be that because we cannot conceive 
without concepts we cannot conceive of something unconceptualized for the 
concept of an unconceptualized is a contradiction. But, of course, it 
is not a contradiction and when people say it is then they are 
confusing it with the notion of a concept which is not a concept which 
is contradictory. We do have such a concept as the concept of the 
unconceptualized for if we have the concept of thigs conceptualized at 
all v/e must have the correlative concept of things unconceptualized. 
Because that concept, i.e. the concept of the unconceptualized, is itself 
a concept does not mean that we cannot have it and make use of it. We 
might as well say that because we cannot think without thought we cannot 
use the thought of something which is not a thought in our reasoning.
oo
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I said above that this thought which lay behind the unwillingness 
to admit a distinction between the given and conceptualization or 
concepts had never been explicitly stated. However, it is a thought 
precisely parallel, in all essential respects, to Berkeley’s famous 
argument adduced in an attempt to establish the impossibility of 
anything existing ’independent and out of all minds whatsoever*. In the 
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous Hylas claims that it is 
quite easy to ’conceive a tree or a house existing by itself, independent 
of, and unperceived by any minds whatsoever'.: However, Philonous; 
speaking for Berkeley, asks 'Is it not (a) great contradiction to talk 
of conceiving a thing which is unconceived?'. Hylas agrees that it is. 
Philonous then responds 'The tree or house which you think of, is 
conceived by you'. Again Bylas agrees. Philonous' next move is to - .  
claim that 'what is conceived, is surely in the mind'. Once again 
Hylas agrees. Finally, Philonous asks rhetorically 'How then came you 
to say, you conceived a house or a tree existing independent and out of 
all minds whatsoever?'. The crucial part of the argument is where 
Philonous holds that it is a 'contradiction to talk of conceiving a . 1
thing which is unconceived '. Clearly, it is true that there cannot be
a thing which is both conceived and unconceived. The notion of such a 
thing would be contradictory. However, there is no contradiction 
involved in conceiving of a thing as unconceived. Of course, in doing 
so one conceives of the thing in question but one is not, because of 
this, bound to conceive of it as being conceived. One is at liberty to
conceive of it as being unconceived. In just the same v/ay, v/henever one
thinks of the world before the advent of conscious life one must, of 
course, think of it, and consequently it becomes the object of thought, 
but one is not required to thinlc of it as the object of thought. One
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can think of it as existing independent of all thought. Berkeley’s 
claim is like the claim that we cannot speak about a world without 
language, or even anything extraFlinguistic, because we require 
language in order to speak
We can note incidentally here that if the distinction between the 
given and conceptualization is denied this would, straight away, seem to 
give the solipsist a start. For if there is no distinction between the 
given objects of experience and conceptualization and conceptualization 
is, as it might be generally agreed to be, a mind-dependent activity 
then the objects of experience in general isrould be mind-dependent, i.e. 
lacking any element at all of mind-independence. The solipsist then 
might argue against the Kantian notion of an impersonal mind and claim 
rather that minds are personal and discrete. He then might hold, not 
altogether implausibly, that concepts inhere in those personal discrete 
minds and, consequently, so do the objects of experience. It follows 
that the objects of my experience inhere in my personal and discrete 
mind and are private to me.
Again it would seem that the given and conceptualization are disti­
nguishable for we can perfectly well understand what it would be to 
2 2  experience something as an X which we later experienced as a Y and
accepted that it was not an X but à Y all along without feeling 
compelled to say that we actually experienced two different things. 
Wittgenstein’s rabbit/duck drawing provides an example here. We can 
experience it as a rabbit or _as a duck or as a curving line with a dot 
or js an example used in philosopher’s discussion. But the given is 
that which is common to all those experienceings as. If there was no
given then it is hard to see why we talk of something as being experien- 
. ced in these v/ays. If there were no given should ^we not say that there
o14
was no such thing but just a sequence of experiences? The rabbit/duck 
drawing v/ould loose its peculiar charm, although it might gain a 
different sort of charm, if it actually were the case that, as in a 
fade-over in a cinema film, one thing changed to another, i.e. a 
drawing of a rabbit actually changed to a different drawing of a duck.
Finally here we might just note that our ordinary forms of speech 
are in accord with the view that there is a distinction to be made 
between the given and conceptualization etc. For the word 'conceptualize* 
and the word 'judge' are both transitive verbs requiring an object.
I have said quite a lot in defence of the view that there is a 
distinction to be drawn between the given and conceptualization and 
knowledge for this distinction will be a recurring theme of the present 
dissertation. I shall use the term 'experience' in the second sense 
indicated, i.e. in the sense in which we might say that it is the given 
which we experience. Consequently, when the sense-data theorist claims 
that experience, or immediate experience, is of sense-data I shall 
interpret him as claiming that experience, or immediate experience, in 
the sense I have chosen to use the term 'experience*, is of sense-data 
and never of material objects, i.e. that the given is never a material 
(2) objectLand always something private, transient and mind-dependent.
'Immediate' and 'Mediate' Experience
So far we have allowed the sense-data theorist his use of the 
expression 'immediate experience' and the implied distinction between 
this and 'mediate experience'. The time has come, however, to see if 
this distinction is really legitimate. Clearly, there is a prima facie 
plausible view that experience is something which one only has at first 
hand and that to experience something mediately, or at second hand, is
o15
simply not to experience that thing at all. In reading a hook about 
climbing to the top of Everest one may experience a number of : things and 
learn a great deal about what it is like to climb Everest but one does 
not actually experience climbing Everest. The term ’experience’, even 
as used at this ordinary level, seems to be one which resists qualifica­
tion by the adjectives 'mediate* or 'immediate'. Some people who hold 
to the sense-data thesis would, however, want to say that our immediate 
experience is of sense-data which gives us mediated experience of 
material objects. We experience material objects via sense-data. But, 
as I have suggested, to experience a material object via sense-data is 
simply not to experience, in the sense we are using the term, i.e. the 
sense in which we say that we experience the given, a material object at 
all. It is important to note here that I am not prejudging the issue as 
to whether the sense-data theorist of the representative realist sort 
can successfully argue that legitimate inference to material objects 
can be made from experience of sense-data. All I am claiming is that 
experience of the given is not the sort of thing which admits of the 
separation into immediate and mediate. Something is either data or not 
data, given or not given, experienced or not experienced. The plausibi-
(2) lity of the immediate/mediate distinction here rests, to some extent, on
the confusion of the two senses of ' experience '. The sense-data theorist 
could say that experience, in our narrower sense, is of sense-data but 
that experience, in the broader sense which includes rational proceedures 
such as conceptualization, judgement and inference, could also be of 
material objects. But, of course, this assumes that inference from 
sense-data to material objects is possible.
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The Suhjeot/Ohjeco Dualism of Experience
The final point which we may make here is the purely analytic one 
that essential to our concept of experience are the concepts of an 
object of experience and a subject of experience. The notions of an 
experience without a subject or an experience without an object are 
incoherent notions. This essential dualism is reflected in the use of 
terms such as 'data' and 'given' for ho?/ could we have data which were 
not data to anything or a given which was not given to anything. The 
subject would simply seem to be that which experiences objects, the
(l)quite non-empirical item for which Hume ironically searched in vain^
and which seems forced on us, not by anything in the content of experie- 
ce but simply by the form of experience. We are now in an area which ? 
has given rise to a lot of confusion. At the heart of this confusion 
seems to be the mistaken identification of an experience with an object 
of experience. It follows from the purely analytical point just made 
that experiences are necessarily private. We count experiences by 
reference to subjects. A single object experienced by two subjects 
must give rise to two experiences. Yet, and this is crucial, there is 
nothing here which involves the necessary privacy of the object of 
2 2  experience and it is the notion that there is which sometimes leads to
solipsistic problems. For sometimes philosophers speak of certain 
objects of experience as being necessarily, as opposed to contingently, 
private and this seems to be a mistake for reasons which we shall see 
shortly. Indeed we may think that talk in terms of experiences rather 
than in terms of subjects and objects of experience has led to unnecess­
ary philosophical problems by making it seem as if there are three items 
of the same type involved; a subject, an object and a third item,, the 
experience, a sort of pseudo-object, somehow hovering in between the
(I) See 13, p. 252.
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subject and object. We need not say that there are no such things as 
experiences but we might be inclined to say that they are, at least, 
things of a different type from, and perhaps logically parasitic on, 
the more fundamental subject and object. These are considerations to 
which we will have to return.
O
O
oSense-Data, Material Objects and Sensibilia
Onr task now must be to continue the process of conceptual 
clarification and to try to get a little clearer about what, precisely, 
is involved when it is claimed that experience is of sense-data. We 
shall see, in consequence of our conceptual enquiry, that sense-data and 
material objects do not exhaust the prima facie possible objects of 
experience. There remains a case for sensibilia, i.e. objects which 
may be public, sustained and mind-independent and yet not material
objects. It follows from this that in claiming that experience is of 
sense-data one is not simply claiming that experience is not of material 
objects but is also claiming that experience is not of sensibilia. In 
turn, it follows that it is one thing to prove that experience is not of 
material objects and quite another to prove that experience is of 
sense-data. We shall recognize this distinction in our present 
treatment. For here, in Part II, we shall discuss the arguments adduced 
in favour of the view that experience is specifically of sense-data. In 
Part III, however, we shall discuss the arguments for the less specific 
view that experience is simply never of material objects. Here, in Part 
II, we shall suggest that the arguments for sense-data themselves rest 
on a picture of the world which is essentially that of common belief.
2 2  It follows that if the sense-data theorist is going to make good his
claim he must establish that his sense-data thesis can be reconciled 
with this common picture. We shall then go on, as promised, to examine 
some attempts at such a reconciliation, e.g. representative realism and 
phenomenalism. First, however, our conceptual clarifications.
The Privacy, Mind-Dependence and Transience of Sense-Data
Above, in connection with the subject/object dualism of experience, 
we introduced the notion of necessary privacy and remarked that, although
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it seemed clear that experiences were necessarily private for the purely 
analytic reason that the concept of an experience included the concept 
of_a subject, nothing yet seemed to force on us the conclusion that 
objects of experience were necessarily private. In this connection we 
also noted that the claim that the objects of experience were necessarily 
private was distinguishable from the claim that they were contingently 
private. Indeed, some sense-data theorists have claimed that sense-data 
are necessarily private while others have claimed that they are conting­
ently private. In the following discussion we shall indicate the various 
thoughts which lie behind these claims and argue that no sense-data, 
indeed no object of experience, could possibly be necessarily private. 
Consequently, at best, the sense-data theorists claim must be that the 
objects of experience are contingently private.
The claim that the objects of experience are necessarily private 
would seem to rest on the thought that the object of experience is a 
state of the subject. It does, indeed, seem that a state of a thing is 
necessarily private tô that thing. The point here then would be that a 
sense-datum is nothing but a state of a particular subject. Now, we 
need not here get involved in the mind/body problem as such. Indeed, I
(2) believe that in the course of this dissertation we shall see reason to
regard the dualism of mind and body as somewhat bogus. However, it may 
perform a purely explicatory function if, from time to time, we cash out 
certain claims in mind/body, terms. For example, if we wanted to cash 
out the thought that a sense-datum was simply a state of a particular 
subject in terms of a materialist theory of mind it might run as follows. 
A subject simply is a particular central nervous system and the objects 
of that subjects experiences are simply states of that central nervous 
system. We might just note here that we shall later see reason to
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regard this identification of a subject, i.e. a pure subject which has 
experiences, with a content, or possible content, of experience, e.g. a
T
central nervous system, is necessarily impossible to make . If,con the 
other hand, we want to put this ground for the necessary privacy of the 
objects of experience in terms of Cartesian dualism we might say that a 
subject just is a soul or mind and an idea is simply a state of that 
mind or, as Descartes himself put it, a ’modification’ of that mind.
However, we must now enquire if the notion on which the claim of 
necessary privacy rests, i.e. the notion of a thing and its states, can 
give an adequate account of experience. Here the matter seems highly 
doubtful. For, as we have seen, it seems that essential to our concept 
of experience is the concept of a subject of experience and the concept 
of an object of experience. But it is hard to see how this fundamental 
distinction between the subject of experience and the object of 
experience can be accommodated by the notion of a single thing and its 
states. For it seems that we must either identify this thing with the 
pure subject of experience, in which case its states must be identified 
with the pure subject also, in which case we have no object, or we must 
identify the states of this thing with objects, in which case the thing 
2 2  itself must be similarly identified which leaves us without a subject.
Of course, we might identify one spatial or temporal part of the thing 
with the pure subject and another spatial or temporal part with the 
object but now we have divided the thing to accommodate our subject/ 
object dualism and consequently the claim to necessary privacy is 
undermined. For it is a purely contingent. matter that the parts of a 
thing are related as they are. Throughout this objection we have, of 
course, for the sake of argument, allowed that it might just be possible 
to identify a pure subject with some empirical thing.
I See below pp. I2I-4.
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We must now turn to the issue of contingent privacy. The point 
here seems to he that it just happens, for purely contingent reasons, 
that a sense-datum, although an entity distinct from the subject, can 
only he a datum to one subject. Again, in materialist terms, we might 
think of this sort of claim as follows. The central nervous system is 
a complex interconnected system. Some part or parts of it might he 
thought of as identical with the subject of experience while other parts 
provide the objects of experience, i.e. the data for the subject. It 
just happens to be the case that those particular parts are related as 
they are and so the object;of which the subject has experience, while 
private, i.e. no other subject has experience of them, are simply 
contingently private. Again, cashed out in terms of body/mind dualism 
the basis for the belief that ideas are contingently private seems to 
lie in the assumption that there is a pairing of minds to brains and 
that an idea, which is regarded as a causal consequent of a brain state, 
present to a mind can be present only to that mind because of this 
pairing. The pairing is, however, not a necessary pairing, it just 
happens to obtain and so privacy is again contingent. It is just worth 
noting here incidentally that Strawson has exploited the merely
(2) contingent nature of this alleged pairing in his paper ’Self, Mind and
Body’(^ ). In an anti-Cartesian spirit he challenges the body/mind 
dualist to show why there should be only one mind per brain and not 
large numbers of minds per brain.
The conclusion here, then, is that it is not at all clear how we 
might be justified in regarding any object of experience as necessarily 
private, i.e. necessarily the object of some subject. It seems, then, 
that it must be a purely contingent matter that some particular subject 
has access to some particular object of experience. So, if an object is
(I) See 25.
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private at all it must be purely contingently private. Whether a 
convincing case can be made out by the sense-data theorist for all 
objects of experience being private in this way is, however, a matter 
to which we must return.
We must now turn to the question of sepse-data and its so-called 
'mind-dependence’. The first problem here is to get clear about what, 
precisely, the rather vague expression 'mind* refers to. It seems that 
in some contexts what is intended is subject-dependence. In others 
something more like brain-dependence is intended. Finally, v/e may 
suspect that a few philosophers use the expression 'mind-dependent' in 
characterizing the objects of experience without being at all clear about 
what, precisely, they mean. Some may not even appreciate fully the 
exceptionally vague nature of the expression 'mind'.
Let us start with the notion of subject-dependence. First ?;e must 
note that it is clear that if the objects of experience were simply states 
of the subject then they would be dependent, i.e. logically or 
necessarily dependent, on that subject. However, we have already noted 
the innadequate nature of the notion of a thing and its states with 
regard to the essential subject/object dualism of experience. We must,
(2) then, reject the, claim that the object;of experience are logically or
necessarily dependent on the subject, at least if it is made on the basis 
of a thing and its states. It is, moreover, not clear v/hat other 
plausible grounds might be advanced in support of the claim that the 
objects of experience are logically or necessarily dependent on the 
subject.
It follows that if the objects of experience are dependent on the 
subject but not necessarily dependent on it then it must be the case that 
they are contingently dependent on the subject. But what, we might
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wonder, does contingent dependence amount to here. It seems that it 
can only he a causal dependence. However, it is worth noting here that 
the purely non-empirical nature of the subject makes it hard to see how 
it might be considered to have any causal efficacy. We can conclude here 
that the dependence of the object of experience on the subject cannot be 
a logical one and that it is not at all clear how it might be considered 
a contingent, i.e. a causal one either.
The subject-dependence of the objects of experience does not appear 
to be a very promising line. However, the brain-dependence of the 
objects of experience seems, prima facie at least, a good deal more 
promising. Indeed, it seems that most philosophers who claim the objects 
of experience to be *mind-dependent' really-mean brain-dependent and the 
most celebrated arguments in favour of such * mind-dependence’ are based 
on observations of the workings of the brain and central nervous 
system etc.
The point of claiming that the objects of experience are transient 
seems to be to claim that they come into and go out of existence just 
as they are experienced by the subject. Such transience would seem to 
follow, not from privacy, for an object may be private, i.e. object to
(2) only one subject, without coming into and going out of existence in
this way, but from some sort of dependence. And again, while, as we 
have noted, it is not easy to see how an object might be subject- 
dependent in either a logical or contingent way it is relatively easy 
to see how transience may result from the brain-dependence of such 
objects. This is so whether they are regarded simply as states of the 
brain or as distinct entities generated by the brain.
The conclusions which we must take away with us from this 
. discussion of sense-data are that if the objects of experience are
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private at all they cannot he necessarily private hut only contingently 
private; similarly they cannot he necessarily dependent on the subject 
and it seems highly doubtful if they could be considered contingently 
dependent on the subject either. However, they may well be dependent on 
the brain. And if they are transient at all, in the manner suggested, 
this would,seem to follow from their dependence on the brain.
Material Objects and Sensibilia
It is frequently thought that the characteristics of publicity 
and/or permanence and/or mind-independence are the very defining 
characteristics of material objects. And in asserting that the objects 
of experience were private and/or transient and/or mind-dependent one is, 
ipso facto, asserting that they are riot material objects, ©lis sort of 
view is very common but I believe we shall see that it is mistaken.
It is, after all, not hard to think of a material object which is 
both private and transient. For example, the puff of steam or melting 
ice-cube which only I see. It might be said here that mere privacy of 
the sort here exemplified is not the issue but rather necessary privacy 
or something called ’privacy in principle’. However, we have just seen
(2) that no object of experience, even a sense-datum, can be necessarily
private. Further, we shall see that the expression ’private in principle’, 
if it is to have any philosophically interesting content at all, can 
only mean necessarily private^^2
It is, perhaps, not so easy to think of a material object which is 
mind-dependent, or at least one which is mind-dependent in the required 
way. Of course, in a v/ay, a piece of furniture is dependent on the mind 
of the furniture maker. However, all we really need here, since our 
. concern is with alleged defining characteristics, is to establish that
(l) See below p. 54*
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the conception of a mind-dependent material object is not inconsistent. 
Here things are somewhat easier for there seems nothing inconsistent 
in the notion of someone causing a chair to materialize simply by an 
act of concentration. Similarly, we may not believe the claims of Uri 
Geller to bring about alterations in material objects simply by an act 
of concentration, not because we feel them to be logically inconsistent 
but simply because we consider them contingently false. Vfe have been 
speaking here simply of ’mind-dependence* and it may be thought that we 
are, consequently, guilty of just that crime of vagueness with which we 
earlier charged the sense-data theorist. However, it is not difficult 
to qualify our claims here in a way which makes them quite specific.
For example, supposing acts of concentration resulting in materialization 
and the alteration of material bodies etc. were found to correlate 
invariably with quite peculiar patterns of brain activity might we not 
then be inclined to judge that the materialized bodies etc, were 
brain-dependent?
It seems then that the crucial things about material objects are 
not publicity, permanence and mind-independence but, as we hinted at 
the beginning of this dissertation, their occupation of three-dimensional 
space. This, of course, is not to say that many material objects are not 
public, permanent and mind-independent. However, if publicity, 
permanence and mind-independence are not the defining characteristics 
of material objects then there is at least the logical possibility that 
there might be public, permanent and mind-independent entities which are 
not material objects. Indeed, on occasions it has been argued that there 
are such entities, e.g. universels on a realist theory. However, our 
concern here is not with universels but rather with sensibilia.
Russell described sensibilia as these ’objects which
o26
have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data without 
necessarily being data to any mind’. The notion of a sensible is then 
a close relation of the notion of a sense-datum only, of course, it is 
regarded as an entity which could continue to exist unobserved etc.
Perhaps an analogy might be provided here by the notion of a cine 
eye-viewer. In such a device the images on the film remain, even when 
not being observed. Whether the images on the film represent a reality 
beyond, as a representative realist might think, or are themselves the 
component parts of material objects etc., as the phenomenalist might 
claim are the sort of questions to which we will return.
It is worth noting here that if all we have said here is the case 
then the recent concentration on the specific issue of privacy, e.g. 
Wittgenstein’s ’private language argument’ and its associated literature, 
is, in all probability, going to turn out much less fruitful than it may, 
at first, have been hoped. For even if it were possible to establish 
that the objects of experience could not be private this would not, as 
we have seen, establish that they must, after all, be ordinary material 
objects.
Finally, here, however, we must enter a qualification. At the 
(2) outset we contrasted the common belief that large tracts of our
experience are of material objects with the less common belief that 
experience is really of sense-data. And recently we have put considerable 
emphasis on the notion that the crucial thing about material objects is 
their occupation of three-dimensional space. But it might be claimed 
by a sense-data theorist who is also a materialist that sense-data are 
material objects too and occupy three-dimensional spaces, i.e. spaces in 
the brain. And from this it might be wondered what has become of our 
contrast between common belief and sense-data theory since, on this
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materialist interpretation, both views hold that our experience is of 
material objects. We need not here dispute the materialist's claim, 
although in another context we might wish to. All we need note here is 
that there remains a striking contrast between common belief and the 
sense-data thesis, even on a materialist interpretation. For, of course, 
common belief does not hold that the material objects of which we have 
experience are situated in our brains but rather in those sorts of 
spaces in which common belief customarily considers them to be placed.
It should, then, be understood that when we talk of material objects and 
contrast them with sense-data we mean objects occupying, by and large, 
those sorts of space which common belief considers them to occupy.
O
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CHAPTER 3 SENSE-DATA AND COMON BELIEF 
Why Sense-Data?
Towards the end of the last chapter we noted that sense-data 
were not the only possible alternatives to material objects. It 
seemed that the objects of experience might possibly be sensibilia.
Let us then, for the moment, accept that the objects of experience 
are never material objects and enquire why it should be thought that 
they are specifically sense-data rather than sensibilia. For surely it 
is not legitimate to conclude straight away from the fact that the 
objects of experience are not experienced continuously but 
intermittently that these objects cease to exist when they are not 
being experienced. Nor is it safe to assume that because I, as subject, 
experience certain objects no other subject is so privileged.
Similarly, we must ask what particular considerations suggest that the 
objects of experience are 'mind-dependent'.
It might be claimed that when two observers look at the same 
material object what each is actually aware of is an image of some sort. 
This is a claim to which we vdll return in the last part of the 
dissertation. These images, it would be claimed, are private because 
(2) observers cannot ever occupy precisely the same position at the same time
and so never experience the same image. By the time the second observer 
occupies the position of the first, the first must have moved on and the 
image which provided the object of experience of the first ceased. 
Consequently, such images are private and transitory. Now it is 
assumed here that because it takes some time for an observer to occupy 
the position of another then the particular image which provided the 
object of experience of the first observer must cease, i.e. be transient, 
to be, no doubt, replaced by a qualitatively similar but numerically
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distinct image v^ hen the second observer is in position. Beneath this
assumption seems to lie the further assumption that the object of
experience is somehow dependent on the observer. It might be claimed
that the image, the object of experience clearly depends on the
position of the observer in relation to the material object in
question. But this is ambiguous. It could mean that the object
depends for its existence on the observer occupying a certain
position. Or it could simply mean that which particular object is
experienced depends on the position of the observer. Clearly, the
second meaning is in accord with the supposition that the objects of
experience are sensibilia. The first meaning is not but we still need
a reason for accepting the first.
We can straight away dismiss the suggestion that it follows simply
from the terminological fact that 'subject* and 'object' can be
regarded as correlative terms that the object is dependent on the subject.
Schopenhauer sometimes suggests this. For example, he v/rites that 'the
empirically real in general is conditioned..by the subject; materially
or as an object generally, because an objective existence is only
(l)conceivable as opposed to a subject and as its idea'^ • Of course, it
(2) is true that if we mean by 'object', 'object of experience' then there
could be no such object without a subject. However, there does seem to 
be a sense in which 'object' is used simply to mean thing, i.e. not 
necessarily an object to anything, and it is, presumably, this sense 
which the realist has in mind when he asserts that objects, i.e. things, 
would, or could, continue to exist even if there were no subjects.
We can also just note here another sort of argument which is 
relevant. The argument in question is based on the fact of hallucinations. 
It might be held that the objects in hallucinatory experiences are clearly
(I) See 23, p. 170.
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private, transient and mind-dependent and that they are, in themselves,
qualitatively similar to the objects in ordinary experience. It is then
suggested, as a consequence of this, that the objects of ordinary
experience must also be private, transient and mind-dependent. This
sort of argument has also been used to try to establish that experience
cannot be of material objects and so we shall discuss it in detail in '
Tl)the final part of the dissertation^ ,
We now come to the major consideration relevant here. It might run 
as follows. V»hen an observer sees a material object light is reflected 
from the material object towards his eye. The lens of his eye focuses 
the light onto the retina where photo-electric cells transform the light 
into electrical impulses which are carried along nerves to the brain.
In the brain some consequent electro-chemical activity takes place. It 
is concluded, precisely why is another point which we shall discuss in 
the last part of the dissertation, that the actual object of experience 
must lie somewhere at the opposite end of this causal 'chain’ from the 
initiating material object and further, that it depends for its existence 
on the brain, nervous system etc. As we have already said we do not need 
to get involved in the mind/body problem as such but we can note here 1
(2) that a materialist might claim that what we are really aware of are
brain states. He might then claim that since there is only one person 
per brain, brain states must be private. Since brain states are constantly 
changing, they must be transient and, most important for us here, since 
they are brain states they must be dependent on the brain. On the other 
hand a Cartesian dualist might claim that brains are paired off v/ith 
non-material minds and that brains somehow present ideas, which are 
causally dependent on brains and their states, to the mind. From this 
pairing of minds and brains it is held to follow that the ideas v;hich are
(l) See below pp. 89, 90 and 91*
o51
presented to minds as a consequence of brain states must also be 
private, transient and brain-dependent.
All the above, then, is simply a bald statement of the sort of 
considerations which seem to lie behind the view that the objects of 
experience are private, transient and brain-dependent and much more 
remains to be said of them. All that we need note for the moment, 
however, is that they rest on a picture of the world substantially like 
that of the world of common belief which we indicated at the beginning 
of the dissertation. These considerations, after all, began with the 
notion that there are material objects and cases where people look at 
them and they went on to talk blithely of sensory organs, nervous systems 
and brains etc., all material objects. Consequently, the view that the 
objects of experience are of the sense-data type depends on the 
assumption that this view can, in the end, be reconciled with the 
substance of our common beliefs regarding the world. Whether this 
assumption is justified or not is something which we can leave till our 
discussions of representative realism and phenomenalism etc. but we can 
note now that if reconciliation cannot be effected then any plausibility 
which the arguments for sense-data may have must evaporate.
(2) Some considerations just noted in favour of the view that the
objects of experience are sense-data seem to be essentially the same as
those Hume had in mind when he remarked that ’all our perceptions are
dependent on our organs, and the disposition of our nerves and animal
spirits’ and concludes from this that ’our sensible perceptions are not
(I)possessed of any distinct or independent existence’^  . We can take it 
here that the expressions ’perception’ and ’sensible perception’ are 
intended as more or less synonymous with our expression ’object of 
experience’. For, of course, if we take 'perception' simply as
(I) See 13, pp. 2I0-2II.
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equivalent to 'experience' it is clearly true that a perception is 
causally dependent on the brain and nervous system etc. For we have 
every reason to think that experiences are causally dependent on brains 
etc. and that if there were no brains, sensory organs, etc. then there 
would be no experiences. It would follow that an experience or 
perception, in this sense, would be dependent on the brain and nervous 
system. Price also notes that Hume's sort of argument starts from 
material objects and goes on to attack Hume on the grounds that sense- 
data are 'always too few and fragmentary' to support the arcount of 
material objects which the argument in favour of sense-data and against 
C )  sensibilia requires^^). We, however, must first get a little clearer
about the precise nature of the various attempts which have been made to 
reconcile the sense-data thesis with the world of common belief.
(I) See 19, p. II6.
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Representative Realism and Phenomenalism
At the beginning of this dissertation v/e noted that certain 
reflections seemed to lead away from the common belief that we are 
aware of material objects towards the belief that the objects of 
experience are really sense-data. This belief, by itself, did not seem 
too bad but we noted that when we coupled it with two other fairly 
plausible views we seemed to be forced into a very uncomfortable 
position indeed. When coupled with an empiricist theory with regard to 
the limits of knowledge we found that our sense-data thesis seemed to 
lead us to epistemological solipsism and when coupled with our empiricist 
theory with regard to the limits of sense it seemed to lead to 
metaphysical solipsism. However, as we noted at the time, while it might 
seem that admission of the initially plausible sense-data thesis 
together v/ith our empiricist theses leads to absurd positions 
contradicting common belief it might not really be so. Of course, a 
rationalist philosopher might feel inclined to cast his suspicion first 
on our empiricist theses of knowledge and sense. It remains the case, 
however, that there are philosophers who would claim to be empiricists, 
at least in spirit, and who also accept the sense-data theory and yet 
would claim that they are not committed to solipsism of either sort.
And, indeed, we have just noted that the claim that experience is 
specifically of sense-data rests on reconciling that claim with the 
substance of common belief, i.e. it rests on avoiding solipsism.
Here we shall be concerned with both the representative realist’s 
and the phenomenalist 's attempts to effect such a reconciliation. We 
shall see that it is far from clear that any easy reconciliation between 
the sense-data thesis and the substance of common belief offers itself 
and find grounds to wonder if such a reconciliation is indeed possible.
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We shall also extend our discussion of phenomenalism into sensibilia 
phenomenalism in order to see if it v/as possible to reconcile the 
substance of common belief, not with the sense-data thesis but the 
thesis that experience may be of sensibilia. We shall note, however, 
that although sensibilia phenomenalism avoids some obvious objections 
brought against sense-data phenomenalism it has problems of its own.
The representative realist attempts to reconcile the view that 
experience is of sense-data with common belief regarding material objects 
etc. by claiming that the sense-data of which we have experience 
somehow represent material objects in the external world. However, it 
has been objected that if our experience is composed exclusively of ideas 
or sense-data then it is not at all clear how it is possible for us to 
infer legitimately from these sense-data to anything in the external 
world beyond. This has come to be known as the 'veil of ideas’ problem. 
Descartes attempted to meet it via a proof of the existence of a 
non-deceiving God who guaranteed, if not particular beliefs at least a 
general criterion which we could apply to our beliefs. This criterion 
was, according to Descartes, satisfied by the belief that some ideas 
represented material objects in the external world. However, serious 
2 2  objections have been made here both with regard to the proofs offered
for the existence of such a God and with regard to whether such a God 
could, with consistency, perform the functions which Descartes required 
of him. There have also been attempts to argue from causality that there 
must be something beyond our ideas or sense-data causing them. But even 
if we accept the application of the concept of causality beyond u 
experience, and it is not clear that we should do so, it is far from 
clear how we could legitimately infer from experience which was 
exclusively of sense-data the presence of transcendent causes of which
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they are the consequences. Further, it would still be very unclear 
precisely hov/ sense-data represented their causes for it is clear that 
similar consequences can arise out of very different causes and that 
consequences are in no ordinary sense representatives of their causes.
One celebrated modification of representative realism involves the 
Lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Primary 
qualities include such things as solidity, extension and figure etc. 
while secondary qualities include such things as colours, sounds and 
tastes etc, Locke held that our ideas of primary qualities did 
faithfully represent the material objects in the external world but that 
our ideas of secondary qualities did not. Colours etc. were, according 
to Locke, nothing but the powers which material bodies have to produce 
ideas in us as a consequence of their primary qualities. However, this 
modification does not really get round the veil of ideas problem. For 
it still remains Locke's position that all we are ever aware of are ideas, 
i.e. ideas of primary qualities and secondary qualities, and this being 
the case we still have no warrant for the inference from these ideas, 
whatever their precise nature, to the existence of external material 
objects.
(2) The last variation of representative realism which we shall discuss
here is called 'critical realism'. In the course of our discussion vre 
shall have reason to return to a recurring theme of this dissertation, 
that concerning the distinction between 'experience' in our sense and 
'experience' in the broader sense which includes elements of judgement 
etc. With this distinction in mind we shall see that advocates of 
critical realism are mistaken in claiming that critical realism is 
quite distinct from any form of representative realism. In an article 
Professor Hirst, who seems favourable to critical realism, claims that
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the fault of representative realism lies 'in its failure to analyze
(l)perceiving or perceptual knowledge'^ , He goes on, 'accepting the 
ordinary notion of perceiving as intuiting, which means direct awareness 
or confrontation, and finding that because of the causal processes and 
of illusions such awareness was not of external objects, Locke concluded 
that it must be of intramental ideas and so imprisoned us in the circle 
of such ideas'. Locke may have done this but it is not at all clear 
that everyone who might fairly be called a representative realist fails 
to distinguish between perception and intuition. Hirst proceeds, 'the 
more reasonable conclusion, however, would be that the ordinary notion 
of perceiving is wrong and that a more careful analysis is needed. This 
will show that an essential feature of perceiving, even as ordinarily 
understood, is that it is the way we discover the existence and nature 
of external objects - that it is, in fact, a claim, often justified, to 
knowledge'. Indeed this is so, for we not only here allow that there is 
more than mere intuition to perception but have earlier pointed out in 
our discussion of experience that there was. However, what interests 
us is just how, precisely, we do make such justified claims to knowledge 
of external objects if our intuitions or, as we would say, experiences
(2) are limited to ideas or sense-data. Nothing in what remains of Hirst's
article provides any illumination here. He says that ' thought it 
involves an intuition or direct awareness, perceiving is much more than 
this. It also involves an active external reference, as implied by the 
knowledge claim; we refer this intuited mental content or character 
complex (i.e. sense-datum) to an external object, that is, we explicitly 
judge that it is, or is the character of, an external object or we 
unreflectingly take it to be this or we immediately react to it as if it 
were an external object'. However, our puzzle remains as to how we are,
(l) See R. J. Hirst, 'Realism' in 10, p. 81.
oo
37
with intuitions of sense-data, enabled to have perceptions, i.e. make 
justified knowledge claims, of external material objects. Simply to say 
that perception is more than mere intuition and that we just do these 
things, e.g. refer to external objects 'unreflectingly*, does nothing 
to dispel our sense of philosophical unease on this issue. For that 
extra which perception gives in addition to intuition must be a truly 
wonderful thing if it enables us, on the basis of intuitions limited to 
sense-data, to leap over the veil of ideas and to refer to and talk 
intelligently about external objects beyond sense-data. It seems, then, 
that so-called 'critical realism' is nothing but a form of representative 
realism which explicitly avoids the elementary mistake of identifying 
intuition with perception but nevertheless fails to avoid the standard 
veil of ideas problem.
Hirst also remarks that 'if we remember that this knowledge claim 
is not always justified - that is, that there are illusions and errors 
- we shall avoid the other pitfall of direct realism in which error 
becomes inexplicable*. However, it is not at all clear that on direct 
realism error does become inexplicable. There might seem to be grounds 
for this conclusion if direct realism identified intuition with 
perception in the way that Hirst claimed that the representative realist 
did and indeed this seems to be Hirst's assumption. But there is nothing 
in direct realism per se which commits it to such a mistaken
(l)identification. For, as we shall note at greater length below^ , the 
direct realist is essentially making a claim with specific regard to the 
nature of experience and not with regard to the nature of knowledge.
It is quite open to the direct realist to claim that we have intuitions, 
at least sometimes, of material objects and, at the same time, hold the 
view that there is more to perception, which he would agree includes
(l) See below p. 83.
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knowledge daims regarding material objects, than mere intuition. It is 
this more, i.e. rational processes etc., which allows for error.
Indeed, it looks as if Hirst, in his capacity as critical realist, has 
rightly seen that there is a distinction between intuition and 
perception, or as we put it earlier between the two senses of 
’experience*, but denies, quite without justification, this insight to 
anyone else, direct realist, representative realist or whatever.
Before we leave representative realism we might just note that if 
we add to the sense-data thesis our empiricist limits of sense thesis we 
may then wonder what sense there remains to be attached to talk of an 
’external world’ and of ’material objects beyond sense-data’ etc. And 
this being the case what sense there is to be attached to the 
representative realist theory which itself makes conspicuous use of the 
notion of an external world of material objects etc. It begins to look, 
not just that the sense-data thesis is impossible to reconcile with 
common belief via representative realism but that representative realism 
is itself internally incoherent, at least on an empiricist view. We can 
also note that a similar incoherence seems to reside in the sense-data 
theory itself. For if talk of external material objects lacks sense 
then so too must talk of sense-data, at least as we have defined them. 
For we remember that our definition was not Moore’s inclusive one which 
allowed that at least some sense-data may, in the end, turn out to be 
identical with the surfaces of material objects. Nor did we simply 
define sense-data as private, transient and mind-dependent. Indeed we 
have seen reason to regard this as an innadequate definition of sense- 
data since material objects can be both private and transient and 
further, mind-dependent material objects are at least conceivable. 
Crucial to our definition of sense-data was the requirement that they
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were not material objects. And, of course, if the notion of a material 
object is senseless then so too must be the notion of any item which is 
even partially defined as not being a material object, e.g. a sense- 
datum. But if the notion of a sense-datum is senseless then,so too 
must be the metaphysical solipsism which is er^ected on the sense-data 
theory. Below we shall see more grounds to regard metaphysical 
solipsism as an intrinsically incoherent doctrine^ ,
Phenomenalism
The phenomenalist attempts the reconciliation of sense-data theory 
with common belief by a different strategy. He does not, like the 
representative realist, hold that material objects lie beyond sense- 
data which are their representatives. Rather he holds that material 
objects are simply classes of sense-data and perhaps possible sense-data. 
Here we can note a more empiricist spirit in phenomenalism than is to be 
discovered in representative realism. For the representative realist 
wishes to claim that we can infer from certain empirical items, i.e. 
sense-data, to non-empirical items, i.e. material objects. However, the 
phenomenalist is rightly suspicious of this inference to the transcendent
(2) and attempts to construct the world of common belief out of strictly
empirical items,' i.e. sense-data. In accord with our present century’s 
concern with language the form of phenomenalism most common recently has 
been linguistic phenomenalism. The central claim of linguistic 
phenomenalism is that all the statements which we might reasonably want 
to make about material objects can be, in theory, made in terms of talk 
about sense-data. However, a great many objections have been brought 
against this claim. For example, suppose one v/ant^ to give the sense-data 
translation of ’there is a table next door’ while there is no-one next
(l) See below p. 6l.
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door who can have the appropriate sense-data. It becomes hard to 
see what the sense-data translation of this simple material object 
sentence would be like. It has been suggested that something like 
’if someone were next door etc. then he would have the sense-data 
XYZ’ might do the trick. But then it might be objected that 
this fails as a pure translation for it includes a reference to 
a material object, i.e. the room next door. It has, however, been 
further suggested that this objection might be overcome by- 
translating talk of next door into sense-data terms as well. For 
example, ’If you had sense-data ABC (i.e. the sense-data appropriate to 
being next door etc.) then you will have sense-data XYZ’. But even this 
fails, for in the material object sentence a particular next door is 
referred to, however, in the sense-data translation no such particular 
item is referred to. One could be in a similar room elsewhere, and have 
sense-data ABC v/ithout sense-data XYZ. It seems, then, that it would be 
necessary to specify the sense-data appropriate to approaching that 
particular room and so on until an immensely, we might even think 
infinitely long sequence of sense-data had been specified. And this not 
just for one possible route through life to the table but for other 
possible routes too. On top of all this we should note that the number 
of sense-data which could be yielded by a simple material object would 
be immense even, perhaps, infinite. For the number of sense-data 
which vary with ’position’ (both angle and distance) must be immense 
but we can add to these the sense-data which arise when other conditions 
change, e.g. both the external lighting conditions and the internal 
constitution of the observer (cases of jaundice etc.). Presumably, 
an adequate translation of a simple material object statement would have 
to specify all these conditions prior to stating the appropriate sense-
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data to be experienced.
However, even if we let this pass problems remain. For the
suggested translation is of quite a different form from the original
material object statement. The translation being hypothetical in form
while the original was categorical. This, by itself, should be enough
to make quite unconvincing any such attempted translations. Indeed, the
translation of some quite ordinary material object statement can turn out
(l)to be quite absurd. For example. Professor Williams has pointed out'' ' 
that the translation of 'Even if there were no observers certain 
material objects would still exist* becomes ’If there were no observers, 
then if there were observers they would have sense-data XYZ etc. *.
Indeed, it is worth noting here that even Professor Ayer, 
phenomenalism’s most celebrated recent advocate, has himself declared, 
for reasons much like those above, that he no longer thinks that 
phenomenalism, as we understand it, can be made to work. In The Central 
Questions of Philosophy he writes ’If the demand for an adequate 
translation requires that the statements referring to percepts set out 
neccessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of the statements 
about a physical object which they are meant to replace, I think it is
(2) unlikely that it can be satisfied* (^2
Sensibilia Phenomenalism
The interest of the notion of sensibilia in the present context 
lies in the fact that a phenomenalist who presented his case in terms 
of sensibilia rather than in terms of sense-data would avoid at least 
the objection concerned with the discrepancy between categorical and 
hypothetical forms which, as we noted above, can be directed against 
. sense-data phenomenalism. For that objection turned on the fact that
(I) See 30, p. 81. (2) See 2, p. I06.
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where there were no observers there would be no sense-data. But if the 
objects of experience are sensibilia, i.e. permanent, mind-independent 
and, potentially at least, public items, then the:translation of the 
statement that 'there is a table next door' simply becomes something 
like 'next door there are sensibilia XYZ*. Similarly, the statement 
about material objects existing in the absence of observers becomes 
something like 'even without observers there would be sensibilia XYZ etc.* 
However, a number of objections have been brought against the 
notion of sensibilia. For example. Hirst notes that one cannot 
observe the existence of a sensible when it is not being sensed and so 
sensibilia 'are just as obscure and hypothetical as the unobserved 
material objects of representative realism and, in fact, introduce the 
very difficulty they were intended to a v o i d ' T h i s  seems, however, 
a little unfair on two counts. First, we might note that if the fact 
that something cannot be observed when it is not being observed are 
grounds for calling it obscure and hypothetical then everything, 
including material objects as we commonly think of them (i.e. not as 
representative realists or whatever), are obscure and hypothetical. But, 
of course, the tautology that things cannot be observed when they are 
2 2  not being observed provides, by itself, absolutely no grounds for
reckoning them 'obscure and hypothetical*. It is, however, true that on 
a radical empiricism of the moment view such unobserved entities may be 
held obscure and hypothetical simply on the grounds that, at that moment, 
they are not being observed or experienced. However, it should be 
noted that it was not this radical empiricism which we earlier 
tentatively embraced when we remarked that we might take it that the 
view that experience, in some way, sets limits to ordinary knowledge of 
the world might have some essential core of truth to it. Neither does
(l) See R. J. Hirst, 'Phenomenalism' in 10, p. 131.
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the tautology that things cannot he observed when they are not being 
observed give us grounds for thinking that things cease to exist when 
they are not being observed. We are familiar with the sceptical question 
'How can you be sure that material objects exist unobserved?* which is 
based on this sort of thinking. And perhaps the best response here, as 
it is elsewhere with many sceptical questions, is simply to put the ball 
back in the sceptics court and ask him for a reason for doubting the 
continued existence of material objects. The tautology that they cannot 
be seen when they are not being seen is hardly a reason.
The second point which we must bear in mind here is that the 
sensibilia phenomenalist and the representative realist are not really 
parallel cases at all. For the representative realist attempts to infer 
the existence of things of which he has had no experience from other 
things of which he has had experience while the sensibilia phenomenalist 
is simply claiming that the things of v/hich he has had experience, i.e. 
sensibilia, continue to exist when they are not experienced.
However, sensibilia phenomenalism still has problems. Again if our 
aim is the translation of ordinary material object statements into 
sensibilia statements the complexity of those sensibilia statements
(2) promises to be every bit as daunting as that noted in connection with
sense-data statements. Further, if our experience is really just a 
sequence of sensibilia then the orderliness of this sequence becomes a 
quite inexplicable mystery. We should not be surprized, rather it is 
v/hat we should expect, if we were suddenly presented with a totally 
incoherent sequence of sensibilia. Of course, it might be suggested 
here that the orderliness of sensibilia is no great problem and can be 
easily accounted for on the grounds that sensibilia are caused by things, 
e.g. material objects, beyond the actual sensibilia. But, of course.
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this suggestion is not in the phenomenalist spirit at all and leads us
hack to some sort of Lockean representative realism. Russell, in his
(l)paper ’The Relation of Sense-Lata to Physics*'' took a line something 
like this. However, it is far from clear that Russell takes this line 
successfully. As a phenomenalist Russell defines a physical thing *as 
the class of its appearances *, i.e. a class of sensibilia, but he 
realized that such a class cannot be the cause of itself and so he 
posits ’matter* as distinct from physical things and the causal 
antecedent of the orderly arrangement of sensibilia which, on occasions 
at least, comprise physical things. However, the introduction of 
matter as distinct from physical things here seems quite gratuitous and 
open to the same objections, concerning the legitimacy of an inference 
from a number of things of which we have experience to a causal 
antecedent of a type which we have never experienced, which we noted 
before in relation to representative realism. We might also note that 
even if we allowed this causal inference it would not account for the 
precise sort of orderliness which sensibilia exhibit. For sensibilia 
do not just form any orderly pattern but, if we may put it this way, 
appear to ’picture* the world of common belief, i.e. a world of material 
2 2  objects as they are commonly conceived.
How, clearly, discussion of representative realism and phenomenalism, 
i.e. the principal theories which accept the thesis that experience is 
never of material objects but rather of sense-data or sensibilia or 
some such but deny that this leads to either epistemological or 
metaphysical solipsism, could go on a long time. However, it is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation to give these topics a really full 
discussion. It is enough for our present purposes to note that it is at 
least far from immediately clear that the sense-data thesis, or, for
(I) See 21, p. 145.
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that matter, the sensibilia thesis, can be reconciled with the substance 
of common belief and made compatible with non-solipsistic conclusions. 
Indeed, it seems that there are some very grave and, we may even feel, 
insurmountable obstacles in the way here. Perhaps, then, we should look 
elsewhere for a solution to our difficulty and as we already suggested 
we might be wise to start with the sense-data thesis or rather, since 
sensibilia seem hardly more adequate than sense-data, with the more 
general view that experience is never really of material objects. 
However, before we do this we shall discuss tv/o of the most celebrated 
recent treatments of the issues with which we are concerned, I have in 
mind here the treatments of Wittgenstein and Strawson.
O
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CHAPTER 4 THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT AND PERSONS
(I)WittgensteinPrivate Language Argument'
The point of Wittgenstein's so-called 'private language argument', 
and in this lies its relevance to us, seems to he to establish that the 
objects of experience cannot be private objects as the sense-data 
theorist claims* If the objects of experience were private then it 
v/ould seem that, in accord with our empiricist thesis regarding the 
limits to sense in language and thought, the 'language' or, as we can 
say here in deference to the solipsist, the 'discursive thought' of the 
subject of these private objects would be private, i.e. its powers of 
reference etc. would be limited to those private objects. And, so the 
argument goes, there cannot be such a private language. The essential 
form of the argument then is this. If the objects of experience were 
private then there could be no language because any language, under 
such conditions, would have to be a private language and a private 
language is an impossibility. There is language, this is reasonably 
assumed, therefore the objects of experience cannot be private.
The basis of the argument is the quite reasonable assumption that 
language must be something where a question of correct and incorrect
(2) usage arises, i.e. it must be something with rules. Essentially the
argument aims to show that a private language could not satisfy this 
condition. For the sake of argument Wittgenstein allows that a person 
has a private sensation and that some attempt is made to establish a 
connection between the sensation and the sign 'S*. The intention is 
that 'S' should be entered in a diary each time the same private 
sensation recurs. The keeping of such a diary would, however, rely on 
memory. If one remembered a present sensation as the same as one 
previously christened 'S’ then one would write 'S' in the diary.
(l) See 53» section 258.
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Further, in the case of the private diarist, memory is the 'highest 
court of appeal *, consequently whatever is remembered as having been 
called 'S’ is S, i.e. ’whatever is going to seem right..is..right’.
From this then Wittgenstein concludes that ’here we can’t talk about 
"right”’, i.e. here the question of correct and incorrect usage does not 
arise. Tie ’S-game’, as it has come to be called, does not employ the 
rules necessary for it to be considered a language and the S-game is, 
of course, held to be identical to a private language in all important 
essentials. Consequently, a private language is an impossibility.
First we might wonder why it should be claimed that ’whatever is 
going to seem right..is..right’. For might not the private diarist's 
memory be mistaken and what seemed right to him not be right at all. 
However, Wittgenstein may mean here that as far as the private diarist 
is concerned whatever seems right is right. But the force of the 
expression 'as far as the private diarist is concerned' makes this mean 
no more or less than what seems right to the private diarist seems right 
to the private diarist. But it is not even clear that the private 
diarist himself must identify the notions of seeming right to him and 
being right. For he may seem to remember occasions on which something 
seemed right to him but later seemed wrong to him and this would provide 
him with a distinction between seeming right to him and being right. He 
could share with us the view that seeming right to oneself is not the 
same as being right.
It is worth pausing for a moment here to note incidentally that 
Wittgenstein, here in the private language argument, uses the view, 
shared by Professors Goodman and Ayer^^\ that, at some fundamental 
level, things are settled by the observer's decree. That is, if the 
observer says that something is 'red' then it is, by his decree, red.
(l) See 2, p. 94 and 12, pp. 99-101.
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However, this view itself is rather implausible. Language is surely not 
just a continual christening procedure. The principal thought v/hich lies 
behind this particular view concerns an attempt to avoid a particular 
brand of scepticism. The sceptical argument concerns the fallibility of 
memory. It is pointed out that, on occasions, our memories have misled 
us. It is then suggested that if this is so it might be the case that 
we are constantly making mistakes, even about such fundamental issues as 
our use of colour words such as 'red'. Consequently, even our use of 
such basic expressions as this must be subject to doubt. Now, of course, 
one way to block the sceptic here is to adopt this rather drastic move 
of claiming that the observer's decree settles what colour things are. 
Thus, if I now call something 'blue' then it is blue and there is no 
question of my being mistaken in calling it 'blue'. However, there is 
another more plausible way to resist the sceptic. We can accept that, 
on occasions, memory has misled us and that it is possible that we are 
mistaken even in our most basic assertions. It is these points which 
Goodman and Ayer reject by attempting to make such assertions 
incorrigible. Hut we can still deny that these two points, taken by 
themselves, provide us with any legitimate grounds at all for doubting
(2) any particular basic assertion. What we need for doubt are quite
particular and coherent reasons for thinking that I may well be 
mistaken on some particular issue, e.g. that I have recently taken drugs 
etc.(^) Mere reminders of some past mistakes plus the logical possibility 
of present error, which is something we cannot avoid since it is a 
contingent world in which beliefs are generally contingently related 
to their objects, are not sufficient grounds for genuine doubt.
However, even if the claim that whatever is going to seem right is 
„ right is accepted there are still difficulties. For it is not clear
(l) See below p. 77.
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precisely how the final conclusion of the argument that 'here we can't 
talk about "right"' follows from the claim that 'whatever is going to 
seem right to me is right'. For 'whatever is going to seem right to me 
is right' does not entail that some things cannot seem wrong and 
therefore preserve a use for 'wrong' and indeed 'right'. Thus the 
sense-data theorist can claim that if the S-game player remembers a 
sensation as one originally christened 'S' then he should call it 'S' 
and to call it 'not S’ would be 'wrong'. Wittgenstein claims with 
regard to the S-game 'but in the present case I have no criterion of 
correctness' but here he is mistaken. Memory provides the criterion of 
'correctness', i.e. the basis on which one would judge 'S' or 'not S' to 
be 'right' in any particular case. Nor does this, as might first be 
thought, dissolve completely a distinction between 'seeming right' and 
'being right' for the S-game player. For, as we have already noted, it 
is possible that at time tl a particular sensation is remembered as the 
same as the one originally christened 'S' while at time t2 a third 
sensation is remembered as being the same as the one originally 
christened 'S' but not the same as the sensation experienced at time tl. 
In such a case, at time t2, our S-game player might make use of a
(2) 'seeming right/being right' distinction to claim that 'at time tl it
only seemed right that the sensation I was having was S but now, at 
time t2, my present sensation not only seems to be S but is S'. It might 
be objected that while the sense-data theorist might claim for the 
S-game player a use for 'right' and 'wrong' and even a use for the 
distinction between 'only seeming right' and 'really being right' the 
'right' and 'wrong' here are not objective rights and wrongs. It is 
not even clear, however, that the S-game player might not have his 
own use for the expression 'objectively right', a use based on his
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'only seeming right' and 'really being right' distinction. Whatever 
our view on these particular issues it does at least seem clear that in 
the present case where it is claimed that 'whatever is going to seem 
right to me is right' there remains a place for talk of 'right' and 
'wrong* and, consequently, it would appear that a private language 
could satisfy the requirement that it be something where a question of 
'correct' and 'incorrect' usage arises, i.e. it could be something with 
rules.
Another point, made by Ayer, is that the speakers of what is 
deemed to be a public language are in essentially the same position as 
our S-game player. Ayer writes that 'we too are obliged in the end to 
rely simply on our powers of recognition. V/hen we are referring to 
what we conceive to be persisting objects, we may indeed have other 
specimens at hand by which to check our usage. Even when this is not 
possible we may be able to compare our verdict with that of other 
speakers. But then the specimens must themselves be recognized. IVhen 
other speakers are consulted, their signs or gestures have to be 
identified, if anything is to be learned from them. In the end we must 
simply decide that this is an instance of such and such a word or such 
C 3  and such another type of object'
Indeed, we can note that this reliance on memory does not simply 
put the individual speaker of a public language in essentially the same 
position as the S-game player, as Ayer claims, but places the whole 
linguistic community, publicity itself, in precisely the same position 
as the S-game player. For if one man's memory can play tricks on him 
then surely so can the memories of all men. Consequently, it would be 
possible for the memories of the members of a linguistic community to go 
. adrift. It would even be possible for the memories of such a community, 
(I) See 2, p. 95.
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or at least substantial numbers of them, to warp in accord with one 
another. The possibility of the collected memories warping in this 
fashion means, according to Wittgenstein, that whatever is going to seem 
right to a linguistic community is right. That is, the community, vis 
a vis language, is on precisely the same postion as our S-game player. 
Publicity, then, far from being a'higher court of appeal' and providing 
the criterion for correct usage, as Wittgensteineans make out, is itself 
dependent on memory. The Wittgensteinean may here attempt to resist the 
suggestion that the linguistic uses of a community, publicity itself, 
depends, in the last resort, on the aggregate of the individual memories 
of the people who comprise that community. But if such uses are not so 
dependent then it becomes very hard to see what they do depend on and 
how they arise. The Wittgensteinean may claim that the uses of a 
community are just there and that is that and that our problem here is 
itself somehow illegitimate. As Wittgenstein himself said in the 
Philosophical Investigations ’What has to be accepted, the given, is - 
so. one could say - forms of life' and in On Certainty 'Now I would like 
to regard this certainty.. .as a form of life. But that means I want to
O
conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified;
(l)as it were, as something animal' But it is far from clear why we
should be satisfied with the bald assertion that the uses are just there 
and that is that, i.e. that what has to be accepted are such'forms of 
life '. Nor is it obvious that the question is illegitimate. Though it 
is tempting to label any problem which does not prompt a ready solution 
'illegitimate' this, in the end, leads only to an unquestioning 
dogmaticism. On the other hand the Wittgensteinean might try to 
develop a response here by appealing, to some notion of an impersonal 
. consciousness and using this notion to suggest that publicity does not 
(l) See 33» p. 226e and 52, sections 558 and 559»
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depend on. the individual members of a community but rather this 
impersonal consciousness, this group mind. Here we are reminded of the 
Kantian impersonal self and we shall return to a discussion of this notion 
later(l).
Finally we can note that the sense-data theorist will have his 
own reason for remaining unimpressed by the Wittgensteinean's faith in 
publicity for, on his view, that notion of a public is itself based on 
his own sense-data. Consequently, an appeal to publicity is, on his 
view, nothing more than a lightly disguised appeal to memories of 
sense-data.
We can conclude, then, that the private language argument fails. 
However, it will be useful in attempting to get a clear view of the 
geography of our topic if we trace out some of the implications which the 
success of the private language argument would have had. First we can 
note that, as earlier observed, sense-data are not the only possible 
private objects of experience. Material objects too could be private 
objects of experience. We might now imagine some desert island devoid 
of conscious life except for one individual who survived without ever 
having known what it was to grow up in a linguistic community. Clearly 
the experience of such an individual could well be limited to private 
objects. The success of the private language argument would have 
denied to this individual the possibility of developing his own 
language, no matter how rudimentary. This, we might feel, is not too 
bad for certainly we would not expect such an individual to engage in 
much, if any, explicit utterance of a linguistic kind. However, we must 
remember that the term ' language ' in the Wittgensteinean literature is 
frequently taken to stand, not just for explicit utterance but also for 
coherent discursive thought itself. Indeed, it is at this level, at which
(l) See below p. 125.
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it has hearing on the possibility of coherent discursive thought, that, 
given the present context of solipsism, the relevance of the private 
language lies. For we must always remember that we must, ex hypothesi, 
take all the solipsist's views as simply occuSbLng to him, or indeed 
ourselves, in thought. The argument, then, would have denied to our 
individual the possibility of any coherent thought, no matter how 
primitive its form, and this seems a much more implausible claim.
However, I do not want to press this point here. The principal reason 
I have for introducing this discussion of the desert island case is 
that a possible response to it leads us into an issue on which we have 
already touched but which is such a general source of confusion that it 
deserves some further discussion. I have in mind here the issue of 
'privacy in principle' and necessary and contingent privacy.
The sort of response I have in mind would involve challenging the 
assimilation of the case of the desert island dweller to the case of the 
S-game player. For, it might be said, while the material objects of 
which the desert island dweller is conscious are private they are not 
private *in principle'. However, the objects of which the S-game player, 
i.e. sense-data, are private 'in principle' and it is against this sort 
of privacy that the private language argument is directed. The first 
thing to note here is that it is not at all clear what, precisely, the 
content of the expression 'private in principle' is. This is so despite 
its very common use(^\ Generally it is, I think, assumed that by claiming 
that sense-data are 'private in principle' a person is simply asserting 
that sense-data are necessarily private. But v;e saw, in our earlier 
discussion, that the notion of necessary privacy is not adequate to any 
object of experience, whatever its precise nature. It seems that people 
who intend 'private in principle' in this way have simply failed to see
(l) See 2, p. 69.
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that this is the case. If it is the case that the private language 
argument is directed against the notion that the objects of experience 
are necessarily private then there is very little evidence for this in 
Wittgenstein's text. Although it does seem clear from other passages 
that Wittgenstein was himself rightly suspicious of any notion that the 
objects of experience might be necessarily private. We need only note 
here his example of the Siamese twins who both feel the same pain at 
their join. If the objects of experience, whatever their precise nature, 
cannot be necessarily private then they must be contingently private. 
Consequently, both sense-data and material objects, if they are private 
2 2  objects at all, must be contingently private. If, then, the claim that
sense-data are 'private in principle' is intended to mean that they are 
necessarily private it must be mistaken. We are still, then, without 
good reason for resisting the assimilation of the desert island dweller
case to that of the S-game player. There is, however, just one other
thought which may lie behind this talk of 'private in principle'.
Once we uncover it, however, it will be seen that the expression 'in
principle' is a rather peculiar one to use in the context. The thought
here involves the observation that if say, a puff of steam is for me a 
private object of experience it is so simply because other people were 
looking away at the time etc. The considerations normally thought to 
provide grounds for the privacy of sense-data (and we earlier noted 
that they were far from convincing) are of a slightly different order 
and involved such things as an assumed one to one pairing of brains 
to minds. The claim, then, that some object is 'private in principle' 
just comes down to the claim that although that object is contingently 
private the precise contingencies which give rise to its privacy, e.g. 
mind/brain pairing, are different from the contingencies which
O
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determine the privacy of objects which are not said to be 'private in 
principle’, e.g. material objects. But then this is not really a 
matter of principle at all, just of contingent fact, and it is hard to 
see how much of philosphical importance can turn on it.
As we have just seen it seems that, if the private language 
argument succeeded, then, since it is simply directed against the notion 
that the objects of experience are private, it would not only establish 
that the objects of experience could not be sense-data but that no 
object of experience could be private, and this would include material 
objects. Or at least it would establish that such objects could not be 
the objects of language or coherent discursive thought. In all this we 
may well feel that the success of the private language argument would 
have established too much. And yet, in another way, it might well seem 
that it would not have established enough. For it might well seem that 
it would have failed to rule out that experience may be of public 
sensibilia. And, as we earlier noted, sensibilia seems hardly more 
conformable to common belief than sense-data. In other words, the private 
language argument would have failed to establish that experience was of 
material objects, although it is frequently thought that this would be 
(2) a consequence of its success. The supposition that its success would
result in such an establishment seems to arise from the mistaken notion 
that publicity is a defining characteristic of material objects, a 
notion which we have already examined. Undermine this notion and much 
of the interest which has been directed towards the private language 
argument and its vast associated literature must evaporate.
It is also worth noting that, if the private language argument had 
succeeded in showing that experience could not be of private objects,
, what we noted as oUr central concern, that of reconciling those plausible
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views which seemed to lead to the sense-data thesis, and via it to 
solipsism, with the non-solipsistic views entrenched in common belief, 
is still untouched. For it would have been made clear that the sense- 
data thesis could not have been correct but precisely how and where our 
error was in developing that thesis would still remain a mystery.
Above I noted rather tentatively that the private language argument 
’might well seem’ to fail to rule out the possibility that experience 
might be of public sensibilia. And mention of sensibilia reminds us 
that in the course of our discussions our concerns have expanded. We 
began by noting only the sense-data thesis and how this seemed to lead 
to solipsism. But in trying to get clear about the notion of sense-data 
we noted at least the prima facie possibility of sensibilia. And now we
must note that the notion of sensibilia brings its own difficulties.
These concern questions such as, if experience was of sensibilia, could 
one ever know if any particular sensible was an object to some other 
subject? That is, does the sensibilia thesis imply its own form of 
epistemological solipsism? Again, if experience was of sensibilia, could 
one even have the notion of oneself as a personal subject to be 
distinguished from other such subjects? That is, does the sensibilia
(2) thesis imply its own form of metaphysical solipsism? These are difficult
questions and I do not intend to embark on a discussion of them here.
For, I believe, our energies would be better spen&in a thorough 
examination of the arguments which are normally adduced in favour of the 
more general thesis that experience, whether it be of sense-data or 
sensibilia, is never of material objects as commonly thought. If we can 
show that there is no good ground for this conclusion then we can safely 
disregard the sensibilia thesis and its attendant difficulties.
It is only fair to note, however, before leaving the private language
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argument that it is simply one part, though a central part, of the later
Wittgenstein’s treatment of the issue of privacy. Amongst the remaining
material, perhaps the most relevant to us would seem to he Wittgenstein’s
claim in The Blue Eook^^  ^that all the solipsist wants is a ’new
notation’. However, by ’solipsist’ here it would seem that Wittgenstein
does not intend any of the standard solipsisms with which we have been
concerned. For he writes ’the man whom we call a solipsist and who says
that only his experiences are real, does not thereby disagree with us
about any practical question of fact’. However, it seems clear that our
solipsists do disagree with us about questions of fact. Rather what
Wittgenstein seems to have in mind here, when he talks of a ’solipsist’
who does not disagree with us about any practical question of fact, is
his own position in the Tractatus where he writes ’the self of
solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the
(?)reality co-ordinated v/ith it’  ^ It is this blend of ’empirical 
realism and transcendental idealism’, to borrow a Kantian phrase, where 
empirical reality, i.e. practical questions of fact, is not denied that 
seems to provide the target for Wittgenstein’s remarks about the 
’solipsist’ simply requiring a new notation and not really disagreeing 
2 2  with us about any empirical matter. That is to say it is not really
v/hat we would recognize as a solipsist at all but rather a quite 
distinguishable, though related, Kantian or Schopenhauerian 
transcendental idealist.
(l) See 51» P* 57 and p. 59* (2) See 34» section 5.64*
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Strawson’s Persons
In his book Individuals Professor Strawson might seem to provide
some good ammunition against the metaphysical solipsist. His principal
concern in the chapter entitled ’Persons’ is to argue that Cartesian
dualism is a fundamental error and that the dualist could not even state
his position, i.e. that he is essentially a mental substance to which are
attributable states of consciousness and that he is distinct from his
body to which are attributable material characteristics, if it were not
the case that a person was an individual to which are attributable both
states of consciousness and material characteristics. However, the
grounds for Strawson’s view with regard to persons include the claim
that ’there would be no question of ascribing one’s own states of
conciousness, or experiences, to anything, unless one also ascribed, or
were ready and able to ascribe, states of consciousness, or experiences,
to other individual entities of the same logical type as that thing to
(l)which one ascribes one ’ s own states of consciousness ’ ^ , And this, of
course, is a precise contradiction of the standard metaphysical 
solipsistis claim that there is ’only me and my objects of experience, 
beyond this lies nonsense’. Strawson would hold, then, that the 
2 2  standard metaphysical solipsist can only make his claim if he ascribes,
or is ready and able to ascribe, consciousness to others and this is 
precisely what the solipsist claims would be nonsensical.
Here we have represented the metaphysical solipsist as denying any 
significance or sense to the claim that there may be other 
consciousnesses and that he alone was that thing of which consciousness 
could be significantly predicated. Indeed this is a natural way to 
interpret his position. However, if we recall carefully what we stated 
at the beginning was the position of the metaphysical solipsist it was 
(I) See 26, p. IO4.
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simply that 'the world, in the only way in which I can attach any 
genuine sense to such a notion, is limited to me and the fleeting, 
private and mind-dependent sense-data of which I am conscious; beyond 
this lies nonsense'. There are, then, in the world of the metaphysical 
solipsist, a number of items, i.e. himself plus the objects, i.e. sense- 
data, of which he is conscious, (it may be that some metaphysical 
solipsists vsrongly take the objects of experience simply to be states 
of themselves and so may conclude that there is really just one thing in 
the world, i.e. himself, albeit in a number of states. However, we have 
already seen that this view, that the objects of experience are simply 
states of the subject, runs into serious difficulty of a logical sort 
over the essential subject/object dualism of experience.) This observation 
suggests a rather desperate way in which the metaphysical solipsist might 
try to meet Strawson's claim regarding the conditions for the use of 
the predicate 'is conscious*. For might he not point out - again it 
must be remembered that expressions like 'point out', when used of the 
solipsist, may be taken, ex hypothesi, to mean something like 'think to 
himself* - that, since, in his world, there is a number of items, there 
is nothing to stop him accepting that there is also a range of 
22) identifiable particulars of which 'is conscious* is significantly
predicable? He would have in mind here, presumably, himself and some of 
his objects of experience. For to remain a solipsist all he needs to 
claim is that while 'is conscious' may be significantly predicable of a 
range of particulars it is only truly predicable of one particular, that 
particular being himself. It might be thought that this move is not 
legitimate because 'is conscious' is not significantly predicable of the 
objects of consciousness, at least if they are sense-data. Although I 
would not want to be too dogmatic on it I am inclined to accept this point.
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For it seems that it is a pure subject of which we want to predicate
consciousness and this, as we have remarked, is not a possible
empirical item at all but rather some point of a purely logical nature 
forced on us by the form of experience. Indeed, despite what Strawson 
says, it might seem generally that there is something strange about 
predicating consciousness of any empirical item. Try looking at one's 
body and saying of it 'This is conscious'. Whatever our view on this 
precise point, however, it does seem that the solipsist's move which led 
us to it is a rather strained attempt to meet the conditions which 
Strawson requires for the use of the predicate 'is conscious'. However, 
we have not yet touched on the grounds Strawson adduces in favour of
acceptance of these conditions and this we must now do.
The conditions Strawson sets for the use of the predicate 'is conscious' 
rest on what he calls the 'purely logical point' that 'the idea of a 
predicate is correlative with that of a range of distinguishable 
individuals of which the predicate can be significantly, though not 
necessarily truly affirmed'. Professor Vesey remarks of this claim that 
it is 'by trying to think of a predicate which can be significantly 
affirmed of only one thing that one realizes the truth of what Strawson 
2 2  is saying. One cannot do it'(^). But plausible though this sounds it
is hardly likely to convince the metaphysical solipsist for he may 
simply reply that we do not have, to look very hard for such a predicate 
for the predicate 'is conscious', he being the only thing to which that 
predicate can be significantly applied, gives us an example straight away. 
Behind Strawson's claim here rather seems to lie his committment to the 
theory of the asymmetry of subjects and predicates, an asymmetry which 
is supposed to reflect the fundamental type dualism of particulars and 
universals.
(I) See 28, p.41.
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Whether we share Strawson’s committment to this type of dualism 
and its alleged reflection in the asymmetry of subjects and predicates 
- and those who are sympathetic to Ramsey’s paper ' Uni vers als • may
have their reservations on this point - it does seem that there is 
something seriously wrong with the metaphysical solipsist's claim that 
beyond talk and thought of himself and his own private objects of 
experience lies only nonsense. For the notion of a self or a subject, 
and by this, of course, I mean, a personal self or subject, would seem 
to be correlative with the notion of others. Frequently an error is made 
here and it is thought that the concept of a personal subject is 
correlative, not with the concept of other subjects but with the concept 
of objects of experience. However, the concept of objects of experience, 
pure and simple, is correlative with the concept of an impersonal or 
undifferentiated subject. We are reminded here of the Kantian 
transcendental self and even more of the Absolute of post-Kantian 
idealism. One could logically have the concept of objects of experience 
without having the concept of a personal subject but only the concept of 
an impersonal subject. Indeed this would be a state where a subject did 
not recognize itself as a personal subject and consequently as something 
2 2  qualifying for the descriptions 'alone' or 'not alone' etc. That is,
solipsism would not be an issue for such a subject. It only becomes an 
issue for an individual who has the correlative concepts of personal 
self or subject and others. And this takes us back to our main point, 
for if the notion of others is nonsensical, and this is what our 
metaphysical solipsist is claiming, then so too must be its correlative 
notion of self, a notion of which the metaphysical solipsist makes 
conspicuous use. This, it must be stressed, is not Strawson's point 
with regard to the alleged correlation between a predicate and a range 
(I) See 20, p. 112.
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of distinguishable individuals.
Before concluding our brief discussion of Strawson we should note 
that the epistemological solipsist does not seem to fall foul of 
Strawson's conditions for the use of predicates. Epistemological solipsism 
was, we remember, the view that 'for all we know we might be alone'.
This form of solipsism does, however, allow for the possibility of the 
significant predication of 'is conscious' to others and only claims that, 
as things stand, the objects of consciousness being what they are, i.e. 
sense-data, we have not any evidence on which to justify an ascription 
of consciousness to anything but ourselves. This point is blurred by 
Strawson for he seems to try to get, from his premiss, the stronger 
conclusion that one actually should reckon others as subjects of the 
predicate 'is conscious' as a condition of reckoning oneself such a 
subject. For Strawson follows the assertion that 'there would be no 
question of ascribing one's own states of consciousness, or experiences, 
to anything, unless one also ascribed, or were ready and able to 
a s c r i b e , states of consciousness, or experiences, to other 
individual entities of the same logical type as that thing to which one 
ascribes one's own states of consciousness' with the claim that 'the 
2 2  condition of reckoning oneself as a subject of such predicates is that
(2)
one should also reckon others' ' as such subjects of predicates'^
Now, clearly, this subsequent claim does not follow from the initial one 
since, as we have seen, one might be ready and able to ascribe states of 
consciousness to others without, in fact, doing so. If we translate 1 
Strawson's argument into terms which carry less suggestion of explicit 
linguistic performance, and this, it would seem, we are entitled to do 
in a discussion of solipsism where we have to regard, ex hypothesi, all 
the solipsist's views as simply occuning to him in thought, his initial
(l) My italics. (2) See 26, p. IO4.
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claim seems to be as follows. There would be no question of conceiving 
oneself as a subject of experience unless one were at least ready and 
able to conceive other such subjects. But, of course, being ready and 
able to conceive other such subjects of experience is not actually 
conceiving others as such subjects. Being ready and able to conceive 
others as such subjects might simply amkount to possessing the relevant 
concepts of self and others and being prepared to believe one's concept 
of others instantiated under certain conditions. But being prepared to 
believe one's concept of others instantiated is not believing it 
instantiated.
We can conclude, then, that while we may have doubts regarding how 
successfully Strawson's views undermine those of the metaphysical 
solipsist there certainly does seem to be something incoherent in the 
position of the metaphysical solipsist. However, Strawson's views 
regarding the correlative nature of subjects and predicates and the 
conditions for the ascription of predicates, even if correct, do not seem 
to rule out epistemological solipsism. One last, more general point 
remains. In so far as Strawson's views are relevant to metaphysical 
solipsism they are directed to showing that it, and indeed Cartesian 
2 2  dualism, is an incoherent doctrine and that its very statement requires
its falsity. This being so we can again note that our real concern in 
this dissertation is untouched. For we have already noted that what 
must interest us here primarily is not that some quite implausible view 
is incoherent into the bargain but where and how, precisely, starting 
from what were all initially plausible enough views, we have gone wrong.
At the outset, when considering our strategy^ we remarked that if 
a satisfactory reconciliation of the sense-data thesis and common belief 
could not be effected we might be wise to start with a thorough
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examination of the sense-data thesis and the reasons adduced in its 
favour. However, while we have seen that the reasons adduced 
specifically in favour of the sense-data thesis are less than 
immediately convincing our concern has extended beyond the sense-data 
thesis to include the issue of sensibilia. With this in mind it is time 
for us to turn to the grounds normally adduced in favour of the more 
general thesis that the objects of experience are never material objects, 
whether they be sense-data or sensibilia. We can call this more general 
thesis the ’sense-datum thesis’ to distinguish it from what we have 
called the 'sense-data thesis', i.e. the more specific thesis. If our 
sole concern had been with truth then perhaps we should have begun with 
a thorough examination of the arguments adduced in favour of the sense- 
datum thesis. For it is with these that the challenge to common belief 
originates. However, for the purposes of this dissertation it seemed 
advisable to show first, by way of a little background scenery, the sort 
of terrain into which the sense-data thesis leads. How, however, it is 
time to adopt Austin's advice, given with regard to the sense-data 
thesis, and to stop 'trying to patch it up a bit and make it work 
properly', as the representative realists and phenomenalists try to do.
2 2  But 'to go back to a much earlier stage, and to dismantle the whole
('l')
doctrine before it gets off the ground ' ^ In doing this we shall try
to discover precisely where and how our errors have been made. Our 
treatment, however, will not be that of Austin.
(I) See I, p. 142.
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PART III WHY HOT MATERIAL OBJECTS?
CHAPTER 5 KHOWLEBGE AHB EXPERIENCE 
Descartes
Before we begin our discussion of Descartes we must enter a small 
caveat. Our discussion has, and will continue to be limited, almost 
entirely, to a treatment of the issues in terms of the sense of sight.
We shall, then, be discussing the claim that we are never visually aware 
of material objects or the surfaces of material objects but rather of 
,things of the sense-datum type. However, this need not be the handicap 
that might first be thought. There are two main reasons for this.
First, it seems that the arguments adduced in favour of the view that we 
are not visually aware or do not have visual experience of material 
objects run as close parallels to similar arguments adduced in 
connection with other senses. It seems likely then that if we can 
undermine these arguments presented in terms of sight we could, mutatis 
mutandis. effect similar treatments of the parallel arguments given for 
other senses. Even if this were not possible, however^ it would not 
matter much. For a principal concern of ours has been solipsism and the 
way it arose out of the notion that the objects of experience were never 
(22 those material objects which we would commonly suppose. If we can, then,
for just one sense, i.e. sight, show that this notion regarding the 
objects of experience has no proper foundation then we can conclude that 
we have, for one sense at least, access to the public, non-solipsistic 
world of common belief. Given this, even if it were agreed that the 
objects of other senses were of the sense-datum type we could still, on 
the basis of correlations of these sense-datum objects with sight, have 
grounds for legitimate inference to public events which were somehow 
correlated to the events of the sense-datum type.
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It is commonly thought that Descartes' celebrated sceptical
arguments from illusion, dreaming and the possibility of a malignant
demon lead, in a fairly straightforward way, to the conclusion that
experience is never of material objects. However, the immediate point
of these arguments is to establish that there are grounds for doubting
all our ordinary beliefs about external material objects. For
Descartes begins his First Meditation with the statement that 'Several
years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted,
fl)even from my youth, many false opinions  ^  ^for true.. and from that 
time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to 
rid myself of all the o p i n i o n s I had a d o p t e d ' A n d  a little 
later he writes that it will not 'be necessary even to deal with each 
belief individually, which would be a truly endless labour; but, as 
the removal from below of the foundations necessarily involves the 
dov/nfall of the whole edifice, I will at once approach the criticism of 
the principles on which all my former beliefs rested'. Thus, in the 
argument from illusion Descartes concludes by observing of the senses 
that they have sometimes misled him and that 'it is the part of prudence 
not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once 
2 2  been deceived'. The point here would seem to be that Descartes will
refrain from placing any confidence in those beliefs based on or 
prompted by the data of the senses. In his argument from dreaming 
Descartes claims 'that there exist no certain marks by which the state 
of waking can ever be distinguished from sleep'. The point again seems 
to be that there are grounds for doubting my present belief that I am 
surrounded by a number of particular material objects etc. and I may 
really just be asleep and dreaming. Similarly, in the argument from 
the malignant demon, where Descartes supposes that such a demon has
(l) My italics. (2) See 9» p. 79.
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set about deceiving him in every possible way, it is against his 
beliefs that the sceptical argument is directed. Clearly, however, it 
is one thing to establish that we can never know with certainty if 
external material objects exist and are experienced by us etc. and 
quite another to establish that our experience is not of material 
objects. Descartes' arguments from illusion, dreaming and the malignant 
demon, if they succeed, establish a conclusion with regard to the limits 
of our knowledge but this conclusion holds no implication for the nature 
of the objects of experience. If, then, the arguments work at all they 
simply lead to a sort of epistemological solipsism where the only things 
which I can know with certainty are that I exist and that it seems to me 
as if such and such is the case. But, clearly, it does not follow from 
the fact that I can be certain only of the fact that it seems to me as 
if I am seeing the table that I am not seeing the table but only some 
sort of sense-datum. This is a crucial point for it concerns a 
confusion of knowledge with experience or, more precisely, the limits of 
knowledge with the nature of the objects of experience, which has 
vitiated many discussions of our topic. This confusion involves a 
fallacy which is seldom, if ever, stated explicitly but seems to lie 
2 2  behind many misunderstandings. The fallacy, baldly stated, runs 'If we
cannot know if experience is of material objects then it cannot be of 
material objects'. We see this sort of fallacy most conspicuously at 
work where Descartes, having to his own satisfaction established grounds 
for doubt regarding the material world, supposes it not to exist and 
concludes from this that he is essentially a mental thing without even 
a body. It is only on this basis that Descartes goes on to mount his 
theory of non-material ideas being the actual objects of experience.
, But, of course, it is not a valid inference from the premiss that one
oo
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cannot be sure that material objects exist and the premiss that one is 
sure that one exists somehow as a conscious being to the conclusion 
that one exists as a purely non-material thing and that the objects of 
consciousness are non-material ideas.
We can conclude then that even if Descartes* arguments from 
illusion, dreaming and the malignant demon do achieve their aim, to 
provide valid grounds for doubt regarding the whole material world, and 
it is not at all clear that they do, then this would not prove that the 
material world did not exist or that I was essentially a mental thing or 
that I was not aware of material objects. The fatal flaw in Descartes' 
sceptical method is to move straightaway from doubt to the supposition 
that the object of doubt does not exist. This is no more reasonable 
than the reverse tendency to assume that everything which one cannot 
prove not to exist does exist.
We should just note that Professor Yfilliams^^^ with specific
reference to the real distinction between mind and body, defends
Descartes against this charge of fallacy which both Professor Geach and
(2)Dr Kenny' ' direct at him. Williams' point seems to be that Descartes 
does not derive his real distinction straightaway from doubt concerning 
the material world, but that he is simply, at this stage, concerned to 
establish the clear conceivability of himself as a purely non-material 
thing. It is only later, by means of God's benevolence, that Descartes 
is guaranteed a real distinction corresponding to the purely conceptual 
one with which he is here concerned. Certainly, there are grounds for 
thinking that Descartes, in response to objections by Arnauld, modified 
his position in this direction. However, as we have already noted in our 
discussion of representative realism, there are serious objections both 
to Descartes' arguments for such a God and the notion that such a God
(I) See 29, p. 112. (2) See II, p. 8 and l6, p. 86.
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could perform the tasks which Descartes required of him.
How, we have been concerned to make it clear that the immediate aim 
of the arguments from illusion, dreaming and the malignant demon is not 
to establish that we are never aware of material objects but the rather 
different conclusion that we cannot know with certainty that we do 
experience material objects. However, it might be thought, this second 
conclusion and its solipsistic epistemological implications are quite bad 
enough. For would we really be satisfied only with establishing the 
rather negative sort of conclusion that it has not been proved that 
experience is not of material objects? Don't we want to be free to say 
too that we know that experience is frequently of material objects? We 
shall, then, before examining arguments whose direct aim is to establish 
that experience cannot be of material objects, pause to discuss 
Descartes' sceptical arguments from illusion, dreaming and the malignant 
demon in slightly more detail.
YIe shall begin with the argument from illusion, Descartes m : it e s  
that all he has accepted as 'possessed of the highest truth and certainty, 
(he) received either from or through the senses'. He goes on 'I observed, 
hov/ever, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part of prudence 
not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been 
deceived'Descartes' expression here is rather elliptical and 
opinions vary with regard to what, precisely, he is aiming to establish. 
It has been suggested that he merely wants to establish that sensory 
evidence alone is not sufficient to distinguish true from false belief.
If this is the case then we can agree with Descartes, for sensory evidence 
is, by its nature, incapable of making such a distinction. However, 
there are good grounds for concluding that the point of Descartes' 
argument is indeed to establish that no belief based on sensory evidence
(I) See 9, p. 80.
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is to be relied on with confidence.
Mow, it has been objected that the argument is self-refuting for in 
order' to say with confidence that some beliefs based on sensory evidence 
have been mistaken it is necessary to say with confidence that other 
similar beliefs are true. For it is only against beliefs regarded as 
true that one can judge others false and mistaken. Consequently, it is 
held that Descartes' conclusion, that one must not have any confidence 
in any beliefs based on sensory evidence, undermines his own argument 
which requires that one regards with confidence at least some such 
beliefs,
Dr Kenny, in his book Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy, defends
Descartes against this sort of objection, Kenny writes that there are
cases where 'a deceptive sense perception of an object is corrected not
by any further sense perception of that object but by intellectual means 
Cl)
alone'' ', Presumably Kenny means here that certain false beliefs based 
on sensory evidence come to be regarded as false not in virtue of the 
fact that they conflict with other similarly based beliefs (we can admit 
that further observations of the particular object in question may not 
be necessary) but simply because by 'intellectual means alone' they can 
2 2  be shown to be false. In support of this Kenny writes that 'it is not
by taking a closer look at the sun, but by understanding the reasoning 
of astronomers that I come to realize that the sun is larger than it 
looks'. Presumably here, Kenny has in mind the tendency for people to 
judge, for example, that the sun is about the same size as the moon.
If not then we must note a certain strangeness about talk of the sun as 
being larger than it looks. What would it be to see the sun the correct 
size? liVhen do we see tables and chairs the correct size? Kenny's 
argument, however, seems to me quite mistaken. Certainly it is true to
(l) See l6, p. 26.
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say that many of us, as individuals, would never have thought the sun 
to he many, many times larger than the moon had we not read so in the 
authoritative texts of the astronomers. On such an obvious fact rests 
the plausibility of Kenny’s argument. However, it is far from clear 
that what we have here is a case where we have come to revise a mistaken 
judgement by 'intellectual means alone’. For the astronomer’s 
researches are clearly not a priori intellectual exercises but are 
conspicuously heavily dependent on repeated observations. Further, it 
is not clear that we would be convinced by the reasoning of the 
astronomers, or even find it intelligible, if we had not, from our own 
countless experiences, become familiar with the phenomena of apparent 
relative size varying with distance.
An illustration might make this clear. Let us imagine a member of 
an isolated tribe which inhabits a land permanently overcast by a dense 
layer of cloud. Hone of the tribe has ever seen the moon or the sun.
The tribe is, however, remarkably sophisticated in mathematics, 
particularly geometry and trigonometry. On one epoch making day a small 
opening appears in the cloud and allows our tribe member a glimpse of ' 
the sun and the moon which happen, through some astronomical contingency,
(2) to be simultateously visible. The question then is, by what purely
intellectual means could our tribesman discover that the sun is much 
larger than the moon. It seems to me none and that Kenny’s argument 
involves the claim that a matter of empirical fact can be established 
by a process of a priori reasoning, i.e. purely intellectual means.
For if beliefs based on first impressions are wrong what else has one 
to go on but a priori reasoning if one is denied access to any other 
observations. Descartes, himself, may well have endorsed the claim 
regarding a priori reasoning but it is not one which strikes many today
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as at all plausible. Of course, none of this is to say that intellectual 
activity is not an absolutely essential part of making any sort of 
judgement about the size of the moon or about anything else for that 
matter. It is only to maintain the point that intellectual activity 
alone is insufficient and that, consequently, we must, at some point, 
put our trust in the senses in making any such judgement.
Our original objection to Descartes' argument seems, then, to stand. 
However, it has been pointed out that to establish the non-trustworthy 
nature of beliefs based on sensory evidence it is not necessary to 
show any particular belief false by reference to another belief 
considered true. All that is required is that it should be shown that 
beliefs based on sensory evidence can be inconsistent. If such beliefs 
are inconsistent then one can claim that they cannot both be correct 
without having to place confidence in either one of them. I think, 
however, that this argument too may well be mistaken. Let us take 
Descartes' example of the tower. Suppose we are out walking some 
distance from a tower and we judge, on the baéis of what we see, that the 
tower is round. A little later we judge, again on the basis of what we 
see, that the tower is square. How, these judgements alone do not form
(2) a contradiction. For things, like Descartes' wax, can change shape.
There is, then, nothing inconsistent about judg^ing something to be 
round one moment and square a few moments later. We only get a 
contradiction if we supplement these two judgements with a third such as 
'the tower is a rigid structure and has not changed its shape'. So even 
to get a contradiction of the sort envisaged it seems we must place our 
trust in some belief of the sort based on sensory evidence. The sensory 
evidence here in question being that on which one judges towers to be 
rigid inflexible structures, i.e. a rich complex of past experience in
o73
which one has put one's trust.
Ayer agrees that 'no judgements of perception would he specially 
open to distrust unless some were trustworthy'. However, he 
continues by claiming that 'this is not a proof that we cannot be 
mistaken in trusting those that we do'. He concludes that 'we have to
( I )make good our claim to know that some particular ones are not (delusive) ' ^ 
Here we can note that in accepting that we require a proof that we 
cannot be mistaken in trusting the judgements that we do Ayer plays 
into the hands of the sceptic. We shall shortly suggest that the onus 
is not on the non-sceptic to provide a proof of his most fundamental 
beliefs and trusted judgements ad infinitum or until some indubitable 
Cartesian belief is revealed but rather on the sceptic to provide 
genuine and coherent grounds for doubting those beliefs and judgements.
This, we shall suggest,,is something which the sceptic conspicuously fails 
to do. The image we must discard when considering knowledge is 
Descartes' own one of a building on secure foundations which themselves 
have even more secure foundations and so on ad infinitum or until some 
indubitable beliefs are found. Hume was correct when he observed that 
reasons come to an end somewhere and not in sets of indubitable beliefs.
^2) The appropriate image here is rather Heurath's boat, i.e. an internally
complex, coherent and highly ramified structure yet one which is, for all 
that, free floating on the sea of experience. The major requirement 
being that our boat is sea worthy, i.e. that it is, in some sense, 
adequate to experience.
We now come to the argument from dreaming. Descartes writes 'that 
there exist no certain marks by which the state of waking can ever be 
distinguished from sleep'. The point here seems to be that in the 
absence of such distinguishing marks I may only be dreaming that there
(l) See 4, p. 38.
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is a table before me and, in reality, be asleep in bed. Again this 
argument has prompted much discussion, J L Austin questioned whether 
it could be ’seriously suggested that having the dream (that one is 
being presented to the Pope) is "qualitatively indistinguishable"» from 
actually being presented to the Pope?' and answers 'Quite obviously 
not'\ \  However, Descartes seems to have a quite adequate response to 
this sort of objection. He writes 'I extend this hand consciously and with 
express purpose, and I perceive it: the occurrences in sleep are not so 
distinct as all this. But I cannot forget that at other times, I have 
been deceived in sleep by similar illusions'. The point here seems to 
be that whatever one takes to be the distinguishing mark of a v/aking 
state, whether it be clarity or continuity with 'remembered' events or 
whatever, one can always dream that it is a feature of the dreamt 
experience.
Herman Malcolm's objection to Descartes' argument involves an 
attempt to show that a question like 'How can I tell whether I am awake 
or dreaming?' is senseless. Malcolm claims that such a question is 
'quite senseless since it implies that it is possible to judge that one 
is dreaming and this judgement is as unintelligible as the judgement that
(2) one is a s l e ep 'H o we ve r,  there is something unconvincing about this
approach for it is not obvious that one cannot judge oneself to be 
dreaming. Much discussion of this topic suffers from the rather 
simplistic assumption that there is a quite firm line to be drawn between 
sleeping and waking states. I suggest that most people's experience 
would confirm that there is, rather, a continuous range of intermediate 
states of varying degrees of drowsiness. It is not clear that in some 
such intermediate state one might not dream and, at the same time, judge 
oneself to be dreaming. I must emphasize that what I mean here is not
(I) See I, p. 48. (2) See 17, p. 10?.
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that one dreams oneself to judge that one is dreaming but that one does 
actually judge. This just as one can judge oneself to be day-dreaming.
In support of this sort of view we can note the plausible claims of 
people to be able to wake themselves up out of a dream. It is then not 
obvious that ’How can I tell whether I am awake or dreaming?’ is 
senseless for the reason Malcolm gives.
We now come to a way with Descartes’ argument which involves showing 
the supposition that one may simply be dreaming to be self-refuting. One
thing does seem fairly clear and that is that simply to dream that one is
doing something is not to do that thing. It may be this point which
confusedly lies behind Malcolm’s approach. Consequently, it is a
condition of doubting that one may be dreaming that one is not simply 
dreaming that one is doubting that one may be dreaming. Consequently, 
it is a condition of doubting that one may be dreaming that one is not 
dreaming it. The Cartesian doubt here then is self-refuting since it is 
a condition of doubting anything that one is awake and not simply 
dreaming that one is doubting and awake. But the sceptic may say that 
surely the fact that one can dream that one is doubting does give us 
grounds for doubting that we may be dreaming. But this is not so 
because one cannot doubt if one is merely dreaming.
Let us now turn to Descartes’ malignant demon argument. Descartes 
writes ’I will suppose., that some malignant demon, who is at once 
exceedingly potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifice to 
Receive me; I will suppose that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, 
figures, sounds and all external things, are nothing better than the 
illusions of dreams’ Although, at this particular point, Descartes 
just mentions ’all external things’ as subject to doubt a little earlier 
in the Meditation he writes ’as I sometimes think that others are in
(l) See 9, p. 84.
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error respecting matters of which they believe themselves to possess a 
perfect knowledge, how do I know that I am not also deceived each time 
I add together two and three, or number the sides of a square, or form 
some judgement still more simple, if more simple indeed can be 
imagined?’. It seems, then, that Descartes is prepared, not just to 
suppose that his beliefs concerning the external world are mistaken 
but also that his beliefs concerning simple mathematical and logical 
truths may be similarly mistaken. What he seems to have in mind here, 
then, is a very comprehensive scepticism indeed.
%7hat we first need to note is that the demon himself is little more 
than a rather fanciful dramatic device. The substantial philosophical 
points which Descartes seems to be making are, first, that it is 
possible, even in the simplest, most fundamental, beliefs, to be mistaken 
and, second, that this possibility of error justifies serious doubts 
concerning the beliefs in.;question. Let us take the issue of the 
possibility of error first.
Many philosophers, including, of course, Descartes himself, have 
held that there are some beliefs about which it is impossible to be 
mistaken. In Descartes’ case the belief was the belief that he himself
(2) existed, albeit as a purely thinking thing. Generally the hope has been
that a whole system of knowledge can be built up on the basis of such 
allegedly incorrigible beliefs. Now we need not argue here if there are 
indeed such beliefs. It may be that there are a few although we have 
already seen reason to be suspicious of Goodman's observeriscldecrees 
and we shall, I think, have cause to be equally suspicious of Ayer's 
experiential propositions. The fact remains, however, that philosophers 
in general have been notoriously unsuccessful in effecting the 
connections between the allegedly incorrigible beliefs and the host of
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ordina3?y beliefs for which those of an incorrigible nature were supposed 
to form the basis.
Let us then allow that in at least the vast majority of our beliefs 
it is possible that we are mistaken. We must now ask if this 
possibility is sufficient grounds for genuine doubt concerning the 
beliefs in question. For example, is the fact that it is just possible 
that I am mistaken in thinking that the pieces of paper on front of me 
have writing on them grounds for actually doubting that they have 
writing on them? And here I am inclined to think that the answer is no.
For before I actually start to doubt such a thing what I seem to need is
some reason to doubt and the mere possibility of error is not such a 
reason. For example, if I were reminded that only recently I had taken 
some hallucinogenic drug then I might be led seriously to doubt if there 
was writing on the paper or even paper here at all. In the absence of 
such a reason, however, I need not doubt any such thing.
However, the sceptic may say that he can give us a reason for doubt, 
albeit not one of the specific sort we have just indicated. For he may
claim, and we might well agree with him, that reasons for belief
generally come to an end somewhere and only infrequently, if ever, in the 
(22 incorrigible propositions of philosophers like Descartes. The sceptic
may then point out that, at a sufficiently fundamental level, while he may 
not be able to give specific reasons for doubt neither can the non­
sceptic give reasons for belief. This being so, each side is just as 
reasonable or unreasonable as the other. Consequently, it would be 
quite arbitrary and unreasonable to plump for belief as opposed to doubt. 
That is, the very lack of reasons either way is a reason for some doubt. 
However, the non-sceptic has an answer to this. It involves showing 
that the profound and comprehensive sort of doubt that the sceptic wants
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to press on us is ultimately incoherent and self-refuting. For the 
sceptic, in doubting, tacitly presupposes the very sorts of belief 
which he explicitly makes a great show of doubting. For example, the 
doubt that three plus two may not equal five presupposes that I know what 
’three’, ’two’, ’five’, ’plus’ and ’equals' mean. But is not this 
knowledge simply contained in such formulae as ’three plus two equals 
five’? If the sceptic claims to doubt this then he must also doubt 
what ’three’ or ’two’ or ’plus' etc, mean. But if he does this then it 
is not at all clear what he is doubting when he claims to doubt if three 
plus two equals five. One must, at least, be certain of what it is 
that one is doubting. The assertion that one is doubting but is not 
really sure what it is that one is doubting, i.e. that one doubts what
one doubts, has a very peculiar ring to it indeed. And yet this is the
sort of position into which one is forced by the profound and 
comprehensive ddoubt’ of the sceptic. If we adopt this sort of response 
to the sceptic then we seem to be in line with a recent trend in 
philosophy. Strawson in Individuals writes 'So v/ith many sceptical 
problems their statement involves the pretended acceptance of a 
conceptual scheme and at the same time the silent repudiation of one of
(2) the conditions of its existence’ . And in On Certainty Wittgenstein
wrote ’If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as
(2)
doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty’
(I) See 26, p. I06. (2) See 32, section II5.
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Ayer
Perhaps the most celebrated recent advocate of the sense-datnm 
theory has been A J Ayer. However, even a very brief discussion of 
Ayer’s support for the sense-datum theory would be incomplete without 
some mention of J L Austin’s treatment of Ayer in Sense and Sensibilia.
We shall therefore start with Austin before moving on to Ayer’s more 
recent work on the topic.
Austin’s approach is characterized by a quite unparalleled 
sensitivity to and regard for ordinary current English usage. In 
Sense and Sensibilia Austin also adopted a typically piecemeal approach 
which makes his treatment impossible to discuss thoroughly in a short 
space. However, one or two general observations might be made. Austin’s 
treatment at least revealed that the philosophers who had advanced the 
sense-datum theory were, in their expression, relatively careless and 
clumsy. Consequently, if it came to be thought that these philosophers 
traded on the misuse of terms such as ’illusion’ and ’real’ etc. then 
they really only had themselves to blame. However, despite the great 
interest of what Austin has to say about the richness and complexity of 
ordinary English, we might wonder if he always, or even most of the time, 
(22 scores really palpable hits against the substance of Ayer’s position
rather than against what Ayer has often since admitted to be highly 
infelicitous expression. Indeed this is Ayer’s own view and in his 
paper ’Has Austin Refuted the Sense-Datum Theory?’ he takes a number of 
his key terms which Austin subjects to scrutiny and argues that while 
much of what Austin says is both true and interesting it is really 
beside the point. For example, Austin took exception to the use Ayer 
had made of the term ’real’ and noted a variety of ways in which we 
. ordinarily use the word, e.g. to distinguish real and cultured pearls
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or real and decoy ducks etc. Ayer’s response is to note that we do 
’also contrast what is real with what is only apparent, as in the 
example ’’the penny looks elliptical from this angle but it is really 
round’’ and that we do contrast what is real with what is illusory as in 
the example of the drunkard’s seeing pink rats which are not really 
there. The sense-datum theorist concentrates on these distinctions 
because they are the ones that are relevant to his argument. The fact 
that he does not deal with distinctions which are not relevant is not a 
feproach to him.’
Again we can note how, at the outset, Austin claims that the 
dichotomy between sense-data and material objects is a bogus one and that 
when we think of things like people’s voices, rivers, mountains, flames, 
rainbows and shadows etc. we should see that it is a ’typical 
philosopher’s over-simplification’. Ayer admits that Austin has a point 
here but says that he hopes to show ’that the tendency of the sense- 
datum theorist to rely on a limited set of stock examples (i.e. moderate 
sized specimens of dry goods) has not made any serious difference to the 
validity of their arguments'. However, it is not at all clear that Ayer 
should even go this far with Austin. For while all the members of 
Austin’s list may not, in ordinary English, be happily subsumed under 
the term ’material object’ this is hardly the point. For the sense- 
datum theorist seems to be saying the same thing about them all, i.e. 
that we never experience them at all, as commonly thought, but only 
their representatives or, in the case of the phenomenalist, that they 
are not the sort of objects which we commonly suppose them to be but 
classes of a quite different sort of object.
There remains one other general sort of point which we may make 
here concerning Austin’s general approach. Austin, more than any other
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philosopher, has made us aware of the immense richness of ordinary 
English. Yet we might think, with justice, that this richness was not 
always there hut evolved over the ages as people found it useful to 
coin new expressions in an attempt to make the language increasingly 
articulate. It is a little ironic then that it should be Austin, who 
by constant appeal to current ordinary usage, would seem to tend to 
inhibit this evolution. For Austin's essential technique seems to be to 
stipulate, on the basis of current English, the definitions of some of 
the sense-datum theorist’s key terms. It is suggested that this is hov/ 
the terms ’appear', ’real’, ’look’, ’illusion’, etc. are ordinarily used, 
i.e. not in the way that the sense-datum theorist wishes to use them, 
and that consequently the sense-datum theorist’s use is a misuse. There 
are some grounds here for the fear that such a doctrinaire reliance on 
ordinary current usage might lead to the petrification of language and 
thought. The way must be left open for people in general, not just the 
sense-datum theorist, to coin new uses which seem appropriate to their 
experiences.
Before concluding our discussion of Austin we must note with Ayer 
that one major deficiency in Sense and Sensibilia is the absence of any 
(22 treatment at all of the so-called ’argument from causality’ which is
frequently adduced in favour of the view that the objects of experience 
are not material objects.
In his book The Central Questions of Philosophy Ayer restates the 
’argument from illusion’ in a way which takes some cognisance of 
Austin’s remarks. In what Ayer admits is ’not altogether happily’ 
named ’the argument from illusion’ Ayer claims to distinguish four 
quite distinct sorts of premiss. The first concerns the fact of 
misidentification, the second concerns total hallucinations, the third
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concerns ordinary perspective! variations and light effects etc. and 
the fourth 'the more general point that the way things appear to us is 
never just a consequence of their own nature' but 'is causally dependent 
also on the environment, on such factors as the state of the light, and 
on our own mental and physical condition'.
Let us begin with the issue of misidentification. Ayer has in 
mind here cases of Eskimoes who, while watching a film of seals, 
mistook the images on the screen for real seals and cases where 'a
(l)figure in a wax museum is mistaken for a real person or vice versa'
The first question which immediately arises here concerns why it should
(2) be thought that because I misidentify one material object like a
waxwork for another like a real person then I do not experience a 
material object at all. In discussing this question we shall be 
returning again to a recurring theme of this dissertation, the distinction 
between knowledge and experience. At the outset we were cohcerned to 
establish that there was some fundamental distinction to be drawn 
between the objects of experience, the given, and the concepts and 
judgements etc. which we applied to them. Later we noted that in Hirst's 
claim that there was more to perception than just sensing, or 
experiencing the given. Hirst seemed to have discerned this distinction 
but for no good reason seemed to assume that it was an insight available 
only to the critical realist and denied to the direct and representative 
realists. In this connection we noted that the term 'perception' seems 
to imply at least some element of judgement, i.e. perception is not 
simply raw experience of the given. More recently still we noted 
Descartes' fallacious move from the claim regarding knowledge that we 
cannot know that experience is of material objects to the conclusion 
regarding experience that experience is not of material objects.
(I) See 2, p. 73.
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Now we shall see that Ayer’s discussion is also vitiated by this 
confusion between knowledge and experience. For behind Ayer’s position 
seems to lie the thought that because we cannot have immediate knowledge 
of a material object we cannot experience, or in the sense-datum 
theorist’s terminology ’immediately experience', such an object. We 
find evidence for this when we examine his treatment of the direct 
realist or, as Ayer calls him, the ’naive realist’. The direct realist, 
as we understand him, is simply claiming that, as commonly believed, 
large tracts of our experience comprise experience of material objects 
or, at least, the surfaces of material objects. But he does not wish to 
deny that mistakes with regard to the correct identification of these 
material objects are impossible. He is quite prepared to admit that one 
might mistake a lifelike waxwork for a real person, a bush for a horse, 
a hallucinatory dagger, which he would not deny is ostensibly at least 
a non-material object, for a real one and even a real dagger for a 
hallucinatory one. However, like Hirst, Ayer fails to note that the 
direct realist is simply making a claim with regard to experience and 
assumes that he is making a claim with regard to knowledge as well.
For on pages 80 and 81 of Central Questions Ayer rightly notes a number 
2 2  of ways in which a statement like 'This is a table' goes beyond the
actual given which prompted its utterance. He has in mind here both 
general beliefs regarding such material objects, e.g. that they occupy 
three-dimensional space, have some permanence etc.i^  and more precise 
beliefs regarding the table, e.g. that if we place something on it it 
will not turn out to be made of rubber and collapse etc. He then asks 
rhetorically 'But now can it be seriously maintained that all this falls 
within the content of a single act of perception? Can my present viev/ 
of the table, considered purely in itself as a fleeting visual experience.
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conceivably guarantee that I am seeing something that is also tangible, 
or visible to other observers?'. The clear suggestion here is that 
this is precisely what the direct realist is claiming. But as we have 
already noted the direct realist is not committed in any way to 
denying that in making knowledge claims such as 'This is a table' we do 
make a great many inferences of the sort Ayer enumerates. Ayer is wrong 
then to conclude that 'the naive realists are wrong in so far as they 
deny that our ordinary judgements of perception are susceptible of 
analysis, or deny that they embody inferences which can be made explicit'. 
For the direct realist, as we present him, it is a cardinal point that 
perception is analysable into the given and rational procedures such as 
conceptualization, inference, etc. made with regard to that given. If 
the direct realist denies that perception involves some sort of 
inference it is not the sort which Ayer here enumerates but the alleged 
inference from sense-data to distinct material objects lying beyond and 
in some way represented by sense-data. It is because Ayer is confused 
between knowledge and experience that he assumes that the direct realist's 
claim that we are aware of material objects commits the direct realist 
to the claim that 'my present view of this table, considered purely in 
2 2  itself as a fleeting visual experience' by itself guarantees an immense
number of knowledge claims which are implied by ' This is a table '. It 
was the same confusion which made Hirst claim that on a direct realist 
view error becomes inexplicable.
How the question occurs to us 'Is there nothing then between the 
direct realist and Ayer but Ayer's misunderstanding of the direct 
realist's position?'. For Ayer is no representative realist and the 
inferences which the direct realist took exception to were those made by 
the representative realist and indeed the direct realist seems more than
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ready to agree with Ayer that ordinary knowledge claims involve a host
of inferences with regard to future experience etc. Unhappily, this is
not so for it turns out that Ayer’s confusion of knovfledge with
experience has not only vitiated his portrayal of the direct realist
but his own position as well. For in the chapter entitled 'Construction
of the Physical World ' Ayer begins by reminding us that our ordinary
judgements of perception ' claim more than is strictly vouchsafed by the
experiences which give rise to them'. So far, so good. He then claims
that 'it ought to be possible to devise propositions which simply
record the contents of those experiences, without carrying any further
implications'. We might first wonder if this is possible. For any
proposition at all would seem to carry implications which Ayer wishes to
exclude. Even if we take something like 'red now' it would seem that
such a judgement purports to record some similarity to certain previous
experiences and so even such a vague utterance as this would seem to go
beyond the content of the present experience. Presumably, Ayer here
would argue, in accord with Goodman, that the observer's decree settles
the truth of 'red now' without recourse to other experiences. That is
to say that calling a thing 'red' here makes it red. However, we have
2 2  already seen, in connection with our discussion of the private language
argument, reason to be suspicious of the theory that things like this
are settled by the decree of the observer. However, all this is
slightly incidental for our main concern here is with Ayer's next move.
This is simply to assert that 'it is possible to hold that my visual
(l)field at any given moment consists of nothing more' 'than an array of 
colours'. It is now, with talk of our visual fields as consisting of 
nothing more than an array of colours, that Ayer suddenly lurches away 
from the direct realist. And, again, behind this move seems to be the
(l) My italics.
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confusion of knowledge with experience and the fallacious inferences 
of the sort which we have already noted in connection with Descartes.
For what else would account for the move from the justified claim that 
ordinary judgements of perception 'claim more than is strictly 
vouchsafed by the experiences which give rise to them' to the 
unjustified claim that 'my visual field at any moment consists of nothing 
more than an array of colours' but some thought of the following sort?
The claim 'This is a table' involves inferences but 'experiential 
propositions', so it is claimed, do not. Consequently, it must be the 
subjects of experiential propositions, and nothing more, which form the 
objects of experience. The thought here being that the object of
experience can only be that of which we can be absolutely sure, i.e.
something which involves no inference, and the only things of which we 
can be absolutely sure, in this way, are, so it is claimed, that there 
is red now etc. So it must be that the actual objects of experience are
nothing more than just reds, blues, greens, etc.
Ayer makes the same move in slightly different terms in his paper 
on Austin. Again in an attempt to find some sort of incorrigible 
statement he suggests that it is 'possible to formulate a statement which 
2 2  does not go beyond the evidence, in the sense that it carries no
implications about the status of what is seen'. Again we may wonder if 
this is possible but what we should note here is that Ayer says that 
such a statement would carry 'no implications about the status of what 
is seen'. For this must mean that 'red now' would not imply that the 
red could not be part of the surface of a table or other material object. 
Ayer goes on to say that a statement 'of this kind, which I propose to 
call an "Experiential Statement", will simply record the presence, say, 
of a visual pattern. It will leave it entirely open whether the observer
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is right in treating the pattern as a manifestation  ^ 'of the kind of 
physical object which he claims to perceive, or indeed of a physical 
entity of any sort at all'. We might here become suspicions of Ayer's 
use of the term 'manifestation' for it suggests that he is beginning to 
hedge away from his earlier declaration that experiential statements 
carry no implications with regard to the status of what is seen. For it 
is suggested that what is seen is, at best, a manifestation of the 
physical object which the observer claims to perceive, i.e. not a 
physical object itself. Indeed, we are correct to start being 
suspicious here for on page I4I Ayer claims 'that physical objects do not 
figure in experiential statements'. The clear suggestion here is that 
the subjects of experiential statements like 'red now' do not refer to 
physical objects but to data like patches of colour etc. But it is not 
at all clear that material objects could not figure in such statements. 
For example, let us suppose that there is before me a red table top and 
that I am aware of it. I claim 'This is a red table top'. Clearly this 
is not an experiential statement for it involves a number of inferences. 
Suppose then I substitute the claim 'red now' with a view to getting at 
least close to one of Ayer's experiential statements. It is not true to 
2 2  say, in such a case, that a material object does not figure in such a
statement for the particular patch of colour referred to by the subject 
of the statement v/ould be identical with the surface of a material 
object. As Frege made clear we can easily refer to things without 
knowing much about them. For example, one can refer to one and the same 
star by using either the expression 'evening star' or 'morning star' 
without knowing that both expressions refer to the same star.
Similarly, in an experiential statement like 'red now' the reference of 
'red' could be the surface of a table without the person who made the
(l) My italics. See 3, p. 287.
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statement knowing this. This seems to be the point which Ayer has 
missed because again he confuses knowledge with experience and supposes 
with Descartes that one can only experience what one knows. That is 
that the objects of experience cannot be material objects unless one 
knows them to be material objects and that if all one knows of them is 
what is contained in an experiential statement then they cannot be 
anything more than that, i.e. data like patches of colour.
Ayer’s second sort of fact on which he bases his claims regarding 
sense-data involve the fact of total hallucination. Ayer has here in 
mind the pink rats of the alcbholiccetc. The first point which should 
strike us here is simply this. Why, because some experiences are, 
ostensibly at least, not of material objects, should we conclude that we 
never experience material objects?
Here Ayer seems to have two responses. In his paper on Austin he 
responds to a similar point made by Austin with an appeal to what he 
calls ’considerations of continuity’. He argues that if one is walking 
towards a distant object then ’it is implausible to maintain that one 
begins be seeing a series of sense-data, and then suddenly at the point 
where the object looks to be the size and shape it really is one starts 
2 2  directly seeing a physical object instead*. We might first wonder here,
as we did in connection with Kenny's defence of Descartes, just 
precisely when something 'looks to be the size and shape it really is'. 
But this is a point to which we can return when we consider perspectival 
distortion etc. For what we need to note now is that these 
considerations of continuity are irrelevant to the particular matter in 
hand, i.e. the matter of total hallucination. For a conspicuous feature 
of such hallucinations as pink rats and Macbeth's dagger is their 
disturbing discontinuities ?/ith normal experience. However, to be fair
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to Ayer, he does not put that much weight on this argument here. For 
he goes on to argue that whatever the force of these considerations all 
the sense-datum theorist needs to do is 'make good his initial step, 
that in any case in which anything of whatever kind is perceived, 
something is directly apprehended, or, as I prefer to put it, that every 
statement which claims perception of a physical object is founded on an 
experiential statement, and if he chooses to use the term "sense-data" 
to refer to the "objects" which figure in experiential statements, he 
will already have established the conclusion that every case of 
perception, whether veridical or delusive, involves the sensing of 
sense-data'. But we have already noted that this only establishes the 
sensing of sense-data where 'sense-data' is used inclusively, i.e. in 
Moore's sense, to refer to things which may well be the surfaces of 
material objects.
Ayer, however, has another sort of argument by which he attempts to 
establish that all experience is of sense-data from the mere fact of 
occasional total hallucination. This argument originally claimed that 
'there is no intrinsic difference in kind between those of our perceptions 
that are veridical in their presentation of material things and those 
2 2  that are d e l u s i v e ' T h i s  is a bit unclear but we shall take it that
this is an assertion regarding the qualitative similarity of objects of 
experience in veridical and delusive perception and that because of this 
qualitative similarity the objects of normal experience are really of 
the same sort as the objects of experience in hallucinatory perceptions, 
i.e. not material objects. Austin, however, had challenged the original 
assertion and claimed that 'seeing pink rats in delirium tremens is not 
exactly like seeing pink rats'. Ayer accepts this point of Austin's but 
goes on to say that all he really wanted to claim was 'that appearances
(I) See 3, p. 298.
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were in some way deceptive* and that 'from that consideration of the 
experience alone it was not possible to tell to which category it 
belonged'. The categories here in question are what Ayer now calls the 
'veridical' and 'delusive'. Again we must take Ayer's claim to mean 
that we cannot tell from consideration of the objects of experience 
alone whether they are the objects in a veridical or hallucinatory 
perception. For objects of experience may not themselves be veridical 
or hallucinatory. 'Veridical' means truthful and, while it can be used 
to qualify 'perceptions' since we agreed that perceptions involved some 
judgemental aspect, it cannot, without begging a number of questions, be 
used to qualify the objects of experience. For the use of 'veridical' 
to qualify the objects of experience straightaway suggests that they are 
mere representations which can be regarded as giving a truthful or 
deceptive picture of some reality beyond etc. Certainly we can form 
veridical or non-veridical judgements on the basis of certain objects 
of experience but the objects themselves, we would hold, cannot be said 
to be truthful or not. But now it is far from clear why it should be 
thought to follow from the fact that we cannot tell from consideration 
of an object of experience alone whether it is part of a veridical or 
2 2  delusive perception, even if we accept this as true, that an object of
experience in a veridical perception must be of the same sort as an 
object of experience in a delusive perception. The argument from the 
fact that we cannot tell any difference to the conclusion that there 
cannot be any difference is surely invalid. It is worth noting here also 
that it is never, or hardly ever, that we do come to the conclusion that 
a particular object is part of a delusive perception simply by 
consideration of that object alone but only in the light of a host of 
other objects, other sensory data#
oo
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Further, it is not at all clear what Ayer would regard as 
qualitatively distinguishable objects if he regards the objects in 
veridical and hallucinatory perception as qualitatively indistinguishable, 
I certainly cannot conceive what sort of thing he can have in mind here 
which might, on the experiencing of it, prompt us to say 'Ahi This is 
qualitatively distinguishable from the objects of experience both in 
veridical and hallucinatory perception*. We might think here of some 
religious or quasi-religious revelatory experience after which all 
ordinary experience was claimed to be, in some sense, a sham and 
delusive. However, when we remember A yer^s views on religion etc. we 
might suspect that this is not the sort of course which might 
recommend itself to him.
We now come to the last two sorts of basis on which Ayer claims 
that experience is not of material objects but rather of sense-data.
The first of these concerns ’the variations in the appearance of an 
object which may be due to perspective, the condition of the light, the 
mental or physical state of the observer, the presence of some 
distorting medium, or any combination of these factors'. The second 
Ayer distinguishes as the 'more general point' that 'the way things 
appear to us is never just a consequence of their own nature. It is 
causally dependent also on their environment, or such factors as the 
state of the light, and on our own mental and physical conditions'. I 
must confess, however, that I am unable to see two distinct sorts of 
basis here at all. What Ayer distinguishes as 'the more general point' 
simply seems to repeat the original observations. I shall, therefore, 
treat these bases together.
The first thing we might note here is that these sorts of 
considerations look, at least prima facie, a good deal more promising
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for the sense-datum theorist than either of those sorts drawn from the 
facts of misidentification and total hallucination. For so-called 
'perspectival distortion^ ' etc. enter, in a quite pervasive way, into 
virtually all visual experience. There is nothing one can look at 
which is not being affected in at least one of the ways mentioned. 
Consequently, no dubious inferences from a few isolated cases are 
called for as they were in the instances of hallucination etc. Indeed, 
we might wonder why the instances of misidentification and hallucination 
have had so much emphasis from the sense-datum theorist at the expense 
of the quite commonplace 'distortions' here appealed to. It is 
incidental to our argument but it might be worth suggesting here that the 
misidentification cases may have seemed much stronger when no clear 
distinction between knowledge and experience was recognized. Further, 
the very pervasiveness of the effects of 'perspectival distortion' etc. 
might have counted against their use here for they are barely noticed in 
contrast to cases of misidentification and hallucination which are 
nothing if not tinged with an element of drama.
Let us then see precisely why it should be thought that such 
Idistortions' establish that experience is not of material objects. The 
2 2  point here seems to be that when, as we would ordinarijyppùt it, I see
a penny from an angle I actually see something which is elliptical. But 
the penny, i.e. the material object, is not elliptical but round. 
Therefore, it cannot really be the material object which I see. This is 
where Ayer's argument from continuity does seem justified for it v/ould 
be implausible for a direct realist to accept that when we 'see a penny 
from an angle ' what we really see is a sense-datum but when we see it 
from the top 'looking round' what we suddenly see is the penny itself, 
i.e. the material object.
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However, it might he asked, as Ayer does, 'liThy when a round object 
looks elliptical to me, because I am seeing it from an angle, or a red 
object looks purple in the evening light, should I have to be seeing 
anything that is really elliptical or really is purple?’ Indeed, 
there has been a tendency, in the spirit of Austin’s ordinary language 
approach, to suggest that we can parse away our difficulties if we admit 
things appearing but refuse to hypostatize appearances. Thus we should 
say that we see the penpy which is round appearing elliptical but avoid 
saying that we see anything, e.g. an appearance, datum or whatever, which 
is elliptical. Rightly, I think, Ayer is dissatisfied with this approach, 
He asks 'If we are seeking a clear view of the facts which are supposed 
to verify our perceptual judgements, can we be satisfied with saying no 
more than that we perceive various sorts of things, including physical 
objects, which sometimes appear to have properties that they do not 
really have?'. Ayer intends this as a rhetorical question and does not 
explicitly answer it or give reasons for the negative response which he 
himself clearly expects. Professor Chisholm has, however, presented 
explicit arguments for such a response.
(2 )In his paper entitled 'The Theory of Appearing'^ ', the title 
2 2  referring to the theory which refuses to hypostatize appearances,
Chisholm claims that the most convincing version of the theory holds 
that appearing is relational and 'that "appearing pink to" designates a 
relation which obtains between the menu and me when I put on these odd 
glasses and look'. His next move is to ask '"What things may be 
appeared to?' and he reasonably ansv;ers 'that the only things which may 
' be appeared to are human beings and other organisas \ endowed with the 
appropriate sort of sense-organs and nervous systems'. But then it 
would seem to follow that 'in those portions of the universe where there
(I) See 2, p. 75. (2) See 7, p. 102.
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are no observers, or where no one is observing, nothing appears'.
Chisholm then asks 'Are unexperienced roses red?' and he answers for the
theorist of appearing that 'roses may^be said to be red in the sense
that they have powers or dispositions to appear red to certain sorts of
observer; but they don't appear red when no one is looking'. Now the
stage is set for Chisholm to claim that on the theory of appearing under
discussion 'it is an objective property of the external thing to be
(l)able to appear as it does to observers like us; but the property' 'is 
subjectively dependent in that the object cannot appear in any way 
unlesscobservers are present'. But then Chisholm concludes that the 
theory of appearing here leads to sceptical problems of just the sort 
invited by the sense-datum theory. He notes that the sense-datum theory 
claims that sense-data represent other parts of nature but asks 'How do 
we knov; that we have a faithful representation'. He quotes an advocate 
of the theory of appearing, Mr Murphy, who claims that 'our being 
appeared to provides us with a "fair sample" of other parts of nature' 
and asks how we can know that here we have a 'fair sample'. Chisholm 
concludes that the 'treatment of unperceived objects, on this version of 
the theory of appearing, is indistinguishable from that of dualism and 
2 2  thus they retain their.qualitative vacuity'.
A couple of points might be made briefly here. First the ordinary 
language philosopher may just refuse to go with Chisholm into the area 
of 'metaphysical' talk about appearing being relational etc. However, 
we have already seen reason to be suspicious of this sort of refusal. 
More important, it might be held that by his talk of properties Chisholm 
quietly lets in by the back door just those sorts of thing which the 
theory of appearing was supposed to eliminate.
Interestingly enough, in his more recent work, Chisholm rejects the
(l) My italics.
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hypostatization of appearances in favour of some sort of theory of 
appearing. In both Perceiving and Theory of Ihiowledge he rejects the 
assumption, which he accepted in his earlier essay, that *x appears 
scarlet' entails that there is something which is scarlet. Chisholm^^^ 
then attempts to eliminate references to appearances by the conversion 
of ordinary sentences like 'Something appears white to me' into 'I am 
appeared white to' etc. The claim is that, in such conversions, the word 
'white' does not function as an adjective and that the sentence does not 
say of any entity that it is white. 'The words are used here to describe 
ways of appearing, or being appeared to, just as "swift" and "slow" may 
be used to describe ways of running'. We can note the theoretical 
convenience of such a conversion but questions of truth and even 
plausibility remains For does it really seem true that when something 
appears scarlet there is nothing, absolutely nothing which is scarlet?
Can one, with any plausibility, look at an object appearing crimson and 
say, with one's hand on one's heart, that there is absolutely nothing 
crimson there? Isn't it the case that when a rose appears red to me I 
actually see, am aware of, red? And when that same rose appears to me 
crimson don't I actually experience crimson? That is, the object of my 
2 2  experience, whatever its precise nature, is crimson. And here we come
to our own reason for siding with Ayer and rejecting the theory of 
appearing and other similar attempts to avoid our problems. The reason 
being that such theories fail to do justice to what seem to be the facts 
of our experience. For to say in such a case as the one above that I 
see a rose which now appears red and now crimson but that there is not 
any red or crimson thing at all to be experienced seems quite inadequate 
to experience.
Indeed, the general point may be made here both with regard to
(l) See 8, p. 30.
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Austin’s sort of approach and the ’language games’ approach of 
Wittgenstein that whatever the prima facie convenience of these 
approaches we are hound to feel them unsatisfactory if they do not, in 
the end, do justice to what we take our experience to he. Of course, it 
might he argued that there are no experiences independent of language 
and that language, in some profound sense, creates experiences. We have 
already noted in our discussion of the distinction between experience 
and conceptualization that this sort of view is rich in solipsistic 
implications of its own and so they do not require elaboration here. 
Enough nov/ to note simply that y/e here take as asdatumtthe realist view 
that objects of experience, the given, the world, reality, call it what 
you will, have an independent existence which does not rest on our 
linguistic ability. We might also note here that just about any puzzle 
could be ’dissolved’ in this linguistic fashion if we were prepared to 
disregard sufficient of what we took the facts of experience to be.
Further, the assumption that wherever we have a philosophical 
problem it arises simply out of a confusion of two or more discrete 
’language games' carries the same stultifying and dogmatic implications 
as Austin’s ordinary language approach used indiscriminately. Our 
initial approach to the world may appear to be relatively piecemeal and 
to take the form of discret ’ language games ’ but such discretion would 
not be a strength and certainly not a panacea to be unreflectingly 
appealed to in an attempt to dissolve philosophical problems. Indeed it 
is hard to see how we could find our way around in thought and get our 
conceptual bearings, i.e. use the ’language game’ relevant to the 
circumstances, if there were absolutely no connections between ’language 
games’ to guide us. In the absence of such guides surely the result 
would be analogous to the state of someone dropped blindfold into a maze.
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i.e. bewilderment. Admittedly, it may turn out, on investigation, that 
some connections are more complex than we at first thought, others 
suspected may turn out not to exist at all while others which lay 
unsuspected are discovered. Nevertheless, it is one web with which væ 
are concerned and it would seem to be at least part of the philosopher's 
task to get clear about its precise structure. In the present context 
our particular task is to get clear about the connections between our 
common beliefs about our awareness of the surfaces of material objects 
and scarcely less common reflections on the nature of perspectival 
distortions etc. Simply to claim that here we have two discrete 'language 
games', the game of common sense talk and the game of talk in terms of 
perspectival distortions etc., and that we should keep them discrete and 
consequently avoid our puzzles hardly seems satisfactory. Again we can 
note that any puzzle can be 'dissolved* simply by claiming that the 
elements which comprise it belong to discrete 'language games'. Indeed, 
we might wonder here what the claim that we have here two discrete 
'language games' rests on. If it is simply the fact that a puzzle has 
arisen then this, as we have noted, seems hardly sufficient. For hov; 
could we ever know a priori that the puzzle was not soluble without 
^2) recourse to talk of 'language games'? However, if it is not merely the
fact that a puzzle has arisen which prompts the thought that here we have 
two 'language games' then the suggestion seems to be that it is possible 
to assume some sort of comprehensive position from which 'language games' 
can be judged as related or discrete. That is, that there is a 
comprehensive 'language game' which itself speaks of 'language games*.
But this would seem to be a denial of the absolute discretion claimed.
For all 'language games' of which our comprehensive 'language game' 
speaks, even those it claims to be absolutely discrete, must be somehow
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related for each must be related within the fabric of the more 
comprehensive ’language game *.
We can conclude this chapter with a brief review. We began by- 
noting that Descartes' most celebrated arguments were directly concerned 
with what we could know rather than the precise nature of the objects 
of experience. We then noted that while Austin's treatment of Ayer's , 
arguments was less than totally convincing Ayer's arguments, or at least 
some of them, were vitiated by the common confusion of knowledge with 
experience, i.e. the distinguishable elements which gave us our title 
for the present chapter. There remained, hov/ever, the arguments from 
colour variation and perspectival distortion etc. which seemed to give 
more promise of yielding the conclusion that the objects of experience 
are never material objects. And, indeed, we have just seen that 
objections to the arguments from colour variation etc. made in terms of 
theories of appearing etc. are also less than totally compelling. Let 
us then try a different approach to the arguments from colour variation 
and perspectival distortion etc.
O
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CHAPTER 6 DIRECT SURFACE REALISM 
Arguments from Perceptual Variation
In this chapter we shall try to counter various arguments 
frequently adduced in support of the claim that experience is never of 
material objects. In this way we shall try to maintain our common 
beliefs regarding the majority of our experiences, i.e. a position which 
may be called ’direct surface realism*. In this first section our 
concern will be with the arguments from peceptual variation, i.e. 
arguments from perspectival distortion, so-called, and colour variation.
In the second section we will be concerned with arguments from time and 
causality.
It will be helpful if, in our discussion of the arguments from 
perceptual variation, we take the issues of shape and colour separately.
We earlier noted that the argument in terms of shape might be put as 
follows. When, as we would ordinarily put it, I see a penny from an 
angle I actually see or am aware of something which is elliptical. But
the material object, i.e. the penny, is round not elliptical.
Consequently, it cannot really be the material object which I see or am 
aware of but something else, i.e. a sense-datum.
(2) This argument, however, is vitiated by a confusion between two sorts
of judgement. One sort of judgement is given in terms of what we might 
call ’two-dimensional conceptualization’. This sort of judgementis^vmost 
conspicuous use is in the hands of the painter trained in the western 
academic tradition but it permeates our culture to an extent which accounts 
for our facility in the interpretation of paintings, photographs, 
architectural plans etc. and, less happily, the prima facie plausibility 
of such claims as ’When I see a penny from an angle the actual object 
of my experience is something elliptical’. This sort of judgement, for
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its own special purposes, deliberately disregards the fact that one 
edge of the penny is nearer the observer than another, i.e. that the 
object of experience is a three-dimensional object set in three- 
dimensional space, and conceives it as forming a painterly pattern on a 
two-dimensional plane set at right angles to the observer’s line of 
vision. The other sort of judgement here is judgement in terms of 
three-dimensions. However, while there are expressions for three- 
dimensional shapes of a very regular nature, e.g. sphere, hemisphere, 
pyramid, etc., when dealing with other three-dimensional objects we tend 
to have resort to ad hoc expressions like ’penny shaped', 'cat shaped’, 
etc. This may partly account for the disregard of this sort of 
judgement.
The above argument for the sense-datum theory mistakes a judgement 
of some object conceived in terms of two dimensions for an appropriate 
and adequate account of the object of experience and wrongly concludes 
that the actual object of experience is a two-dimensional type of image 
and not a material object or, to be absolutely precise, the surfaces of 
a three-dimensional material object set in three-dimensional space.
That we have mastered the culturally agreed methods of projection 
(2) here involved and can, consequently, conceptualize a scene glimpsed as
a composition of two-dimensional shapes on a plane at right angles to our 
line of vision is no basis at all for the claim that what we are actually 
aware of are two-dimensional shapes and not the material objects 
themselves. It seems, then, that the argument from perspectival 
distortion does not force on us the conclusion that we are never aware 
of material objects in three-dimensional space but are only aware of 
two-dimensional sense-data. For it is easy to generalize our treatment 
of the penny case to all such alleged 'distortions’.
oo
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It might be argued, however, that if I can judge a penny as 
elliptical from one place and as circular from another then surely, 
before the penny can be judged so differently, what I am aware of must 
also differ. This, however, is to mistake what is involved in this 
sort of judgement. If, by way of analogy, we consider my concept of an 
ellipse as analogous to an elliptical shape inscribed on a piece of 
glass and placed before my eyes at right angles to my line of vision 
then the analogous argument might run as follows. If, on looking through 
the glass at the penny, I succeed in getting the edges of the penny to 
coincide with the inscribed image while from some other place the edges 
of the penny do not coincide then surely what is seen through the glass 
must differ. This argument, however, again hinges on the sort of 
confusion which we have already discussed, i.e. it involves disregarding 
the third dimension (the space between the glass and the penny) and 
thinking of the penny as projected onto the glass in accordance with the 
methods of projection already mentioned. In such cases, however, the 
edges of the penny only coincide with the inscribed image in a secondary 
sense of ’coincide', a sense which itself rests on the appropriate 
conceptual apparatus. The edges of the penny and the inscribed image no 
more coincide, in the primary sense of ’coincide’, than do two billiard 
balls, six feet apart, literally touch when viewd at a suitable angle.
It still seems, then, that there is nothing in the argument from 
perspectival ’distortion’ to force us to conclude that we are never 
avfare of the material objects in three dimensions which we commonly 
suppose but only of two dimensional, sense-datum type images. What, 
then, we are claiming here is that when I see a penny from what is 
ordinarily said to be ’an angle’ (this expression itself rests on those 
culturally agreed conceptual systems already discussed) the actual object
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of my experience is not a two-dimensional elliptical datura but some of
the surfaces of a three-dimensional material object set in three-
dimensional space.
We should note here that Dr Hursthouse has given a superficially
similar treatment of the present issue and yet one which is, we may feel,
(l)essentially more in the spirit of the ordinary language approach/ , We
should also note that our approach here is not that of the new realist.
According to Hirst the new realist claims that 'all the various
appearances of an object are its intrinsic, objective properties and are
directly apprehended by the percipient. For example, the table which
looks round to A and elliptical to B is intrinsically both round and
(2 )
elliptical*' \  The new realist then appeals to a selective theory of
the nervous system the function of which is 'to select and reveal to the 
percipient one property from each set of properties, for example either 
the elliptical or the round shape of the table'. Clearly, however, the 
new realist, in saying that the table is intrinsically 'round' and 
'elliptical' etc., is, himself, making just that same error which leads 
to the sense-datum theory. For to use the expressions 'round' and 
'elliptical', expressions from the vocabulary of two-dimensional 
conceptualization, in the context of a putative description of a three- 
dimensional material object is, as we have already suggested, quite 
inappropriate. It is, then, not only, as Hirst objects, 'self­
contradictory to say the table is intrinsically both round and elliptical' 
but inappropriate and even, in this context, strictly false to say 
either that it is 'round' or 'elliptical'.
Of course, in another context, e.g. in a furniture shop, it is 
perfectly intelligible to say that one would prefer a round table to a 
square one etc. But this is only because the methods of two-dimensional
(I) See 14, pp. 97-9. (2) See R. J. Hirst, 'Realism' in 10, p. 78.
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conceptualization are already assumed. That is, the salesman assumes 
that one is talking of the judgement in terms of two dimensions which 
one would make of the table when viewing it in accordance with the 
culturally agreed methods of projection, i.e. from directly above it.
It is also on such an assumption that we commonly talk of the 'real* 
shape of the table as being 'round' etc. 'Real' in such a context must 
be understood after this fashion. Thus one might ask the salesman if the 
table in the comer is just rectangular or perfectly square. He might 
answer that it is 'really square' but all he means by this is that a 
plan view of the table would involve drawing a square. In his discussion 
of perspective realism Hirst objects that 'it seems more plausible to 
treat some appearances as privileged; in some conditions we see the 
real shape, the round object appearing as it is - that is, round. It 
may be considered a weakness of the perspective theory that it does not 
take into account the fact that objects do seem to have real (measured) 
shapes...absolutely'. We do indeed treat some views as privileged, i.e. 
plan views, elevations, etc., but this is only for the conventional reasons 
already noted and not because they allow us to see some absolute reality 
which otherwise eludes us. Measurement too is imbedded in the very same
(2) sort of convention. After all, what is a ruler but a one dimensional
device? liVhen one checks the diameter of a table top one is applying a 
one dimensional standard unit of measurement in a conventional and 
learned way. Of course, it may be said that we can measure not just one 
dimension of a table but its length, width and height, i.e. three 
dimensions. Indeed one can but each time one is only measuring one 
dimension, say height, which rests on a convention involving such things 
as the angle at which the rule is to be held etc.
V/e have, then, tried to make clear that our position is not that of
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the new realist. However, it is worth taking note of some more of 
Hirst's objections to the new realist for it might be thought that they 
could also be made valid objections to our approach. Hirst remarks, for 
example, that one difficulty for the new realist is that his theory 
'does not really account for error'. Hirst claims in support of this 
that if 'we are always directly aware of actual characteristics of 
objects, what sense does it make to talk, as we do, of illusions, 
mistakes, or misperceptions?'. There are a number of points we can make 
here. The first and most obvious one, given what we have already said 
about the distinction between knowledge and experience, concerns Hirst's 
unwillingness to grant the new realist or representative realist the use 
of this distinction. For, otherwise, why should it be thought to follow 
from the fact that we are always directly aware of the actual 
characteristics of objects that we cannot make mistaken knowledge claims 
with regard to these characteristics of objects? In the context of our 
own approach, why should it be thought to follow from the fact that I 
am directly aware of particular surfaces set in three-dimensional space 
that I cannot make mistaken knowledge claims with regard to these 
surfaces? Indeed, it is our claim that this is precisely what the sense- 
^2) datum theorist does, i.e. he is directly aware of the surfaces of three-
dimensional material objects but he mistakes them for pieces of two- 
dimensional sense-data etc.
Also we can note with regard to our own approach that væ have 
already made it clear that we are not claiming that we are always aware 
of the surfaces of three-dimensional material objects. For we have 
accepted the fact of some experience, hallucinations etc., as being of, 
ostensibly at least, non-material objects. Our specific concern here is 
with normal experience and the arguments from normal perspectival
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'distortion* etc. Consequently, introduction of talk of illusions etc. 
into a discussion of normal experience in this way is.irrelevant.
Hirst also objects to the new realist on the grounds that 'objects 
must be incredibly complex if they are to possess all these shapes... 
plus, presumably, qualities corresponding to the queer appearance of 
objects when one has taken mescaline or suffers from giddiness or double 
vision'. Again this does not affect our position for, as we have already 
seen, we actually deny that ordinary material objects like the penny are 
shallow ellipses or deep ellipses or round shapes etc. For to claim this 
is to fall into the same trap that got the sense-datum theorist started. 
However, this objection of Hirst's might also be reformulated in a way 
which does seem relevant to our position. It might, for example, be said 
that the penny must be incredibly complex if it is capable of being 
conceptualized two-dimensionally as a large, perhaps infinitely large 
series of two-dimensional shapes. But this seems now a rather silly 
objection for it is clear enough that the reason a quite simple three- 
dimensional shape could yield such a series of two-dimensional judgements, 
each member of which corresponds to a particular point in space from 
which the simple object could be viewed, is a function, not of any
(2) complexity in the object but of the nature of three-dimensional space.
As we have already noted the issue of 'the queer appearance of 
objects when one has taken mescalin or suffers from giddiness or 
double-vision' is not strictly relevant to the present discussion of 
normal experience. However, we may here suggest a way in which even 
these sorts of phenomena may be treated without resort to objects of an 
ostensibly non-material, sense-datum type. Presumably the argument for 
such experiences being of a sense-datum type would run something like 
this. In, for example, a case of double-vision it is obvious that there
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is only one material object, e.g. a pen. However, it seems scarcely 
less obvious, at least at first, that there are two objects of experience. 
At least one, then, must be a sense-datum, i.e. a non-material object, 
and since it seems arbitrary to decide that one is a sense-datum while 
the other remains the material object the most reasonable course is to 
admit that they are both sense-data. There is, however, another way of 
approaching this. It is to deny that there are two objects of experience 
and to hold rather that there is one, i.e. the material object, seen 
twice but simultaneously. Indeed, this seems a rather natural way to put 
the matter when we remember that we call it 'double-vision* and 'seeing 
double *, that is, seeing something twice and not seeing two things, e.g. 
sense-data, once each. Moreover, it is quite normal for us to talk of 
seeing some single thing twice in the context of a time difference, i.e. 
one sighting earlier, the other later. #iy not, then, accept that it is 
legitimate to talk of seeing a single thing twice from two slightly 
different positions? 7/hat we see with one eye may well not coincide 
with what we see with the other eye but this is simply because we see 
from two eyes and not because the actual objects of experience are 
sense-data and not material objects. We might even generalize this
(2) approach to account for some of the effects in dizziness and even some
effects of drugs. On such a generalized account the claim would not be, 
as the sense-datum theorist holds, that a confused pattern of sense-data 
provides the object of experience but rather that a number of ordinary, 
reasonably orderly objects are experienced in a very confused sort of 
way, i.e. in a way which may involve not just double-vision but 
poly-vision and partial vision etc.
Two final points before we move on to the issue of colour variation. 
First, we can note that our approach is also to be distinguished from
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perspective realism which claims that the characteristics of material 
objects are relative properties. The claim is that 'the table is round 
from here, elliptical from there' etc. Again, however, v/e can note 
that the perspective realist, like the sense-datum theorist and the new 
realist, is using the inappropriate two-dimensional terms 'round' and 
-'.elliptical' of a three-dimensional object. Second, we are not 
forgetting that another of Hirst's objections to the new realist involves 
what he alleges is the weakness of the selective theory of the sense 
organs etc., a theory on which the new realist places considerable weight, 
compared with the generative theory. However, we can leave treatment of 
this issue to our discussion of the argument from colour vatiation and 
the argument from causality for we have not, in the present case of shape, 
placed any weight on the selective theory. We will, however, in the 
context of colour, find it of considerable value.
The Argument from Colour Variation
The argument from colour variation might run as follows. When, as 
we would normally put it, I look at the surface of a material object the 
colour of which I am aware varies with a number of factors including 
such things as my position relative to the light and the nature and 
intensity of the light etc. However, the surface of the material object 
has not changed. Consequently, the actual object of my experience 
cannot be the surface of the material object but must be something else, 
i.e. a sense-datum. If we put this argument in terms of a particular 
case it might run as follov/s. At time tl, on looking at some surface,
I saw scarlet. Now, at time t2, on looking at the same surface, I see 
maroon. The actual surface of the material object, however, it is 
assumed, has not changed, e.g. someone has not come and painted it
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maroon. Consequently, at either and probably both times tl and t2 I 
cannot really be aware of the surface of the material object at all but 
only something else, i.e. a sense-datum.
Nov/, we can note, underlying this argument is the notion that, at 
best, a material surface can only be one colour, e.g. scarlet or maroon 
but not both, and it is drawn out of this assumption that if I first 
see scarlet and then maroon and the material surface in question has not 
changed then it must follow that on at least one occasion I cannot be 
aware of the material surface in question at all. V/e might be reminded 
here of the argument from shape which assumed that the penny could really 
only be one shape such as round and that in seeing anything which was 
not this shape, e.g. something which could be characterized as an 
ellipse, I could not be seeing the penny at all. We might v/onder if the 
parallel noted here in connection v/ith the arguments themselves might 
not be extended to their refutations. Indeed, this is what we shall 
suggest. For it seems that we need not accept that a material surface 
is really just scarlet any more than v/e need accept that a material 
object is really just round. Certainly, we do often speak of colours 
like scarlet as if they are quite simple, discrete qualities of a
(2) totally saturating kind whose presence on a surface excludes the
possibility of the presence of any other such colour, e.g. maroon. And 
this certainly makes it seem that if a surface was scarlet then it 
could not also be maroon. However, we need not and, indeed, often do not 
think of colours in this way. For example, we frequently think of 
colours as complex, analyzable mixtures of a limited number of different 
primary elements. And this observation suggests that we might thinlc of 
a material surface as at least in part comprising a number of such elements 
The function of lighting conditions, sense-organs, etc. is then to act
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selectively on the material surface revealing more of some elements and
less of others in a way which accounts for the phenomena of 'colour
variation' without entailing the conclusion that for at least much of
the time it is not really the material surface at all which provides the
object of experience but rather some sort of sense-datum. Our position
is that our way of thinking of colours^  as enshrined in the theory of
their logical exclusion^is, if not mistaken, at least inappropriate to
the description of material surfaces. This, in just the same way that
talk of shapes as 'circular' and 'elliptical' etc. turned out to be
inappropriate when our concern was with three-dimensional material
. objects. Just, as the inappropriate use of shape words led to the bogus
argument that since the penny is circular in any case where I do not see
something circular I cannot be seeing the penny so the inappropriate use
of colour words leads to the argument that since a surface is scarlet
then in seeing any colour but scarlet I cannot be seeing that surface.
It might be argued here that the plain fact of the matter is that colours
are just such simple, saturating and mutually excluding qualities as
those suggested. But this seems far from established and there are many
examples which suggest the opposite. For example, it is part of the
(2) painter's task to look at colours and analyze them into their constituents
Russell, to his credit, noted of the colours of his table that
'there is no reason for regarding some of these as more really its
(l). colour than others' ' 'and we can also agree with him that 'v/e are 
compelled to deny that, in itself, the table has any one particular 
colour' ' '. V/here v/e part company with Russell is where he draws the 
conclusion that the table, 'in itself as he puts it, is not really 
coloured at all. For we would say that the table has not ' any one 
particular colour' because it is, or at least its surfaces are, a
(l) See 22, p. 2. (2) My italics.
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continuous range of colour acted on selectively, i.e. not generatively, 
in a way which allows us to account for so-called ’colour variation' 
without denying direct surface realism, i.e. the view that the object of 
experience is just the material surface as commonly thought.
Indeed, all the talk about 'real' colours here seems more and more 
artificial the more we dwell on the topic. Ayer has tried to devise a 
rather arbitrary way of establishing the 'real' colour of something on 
the basis of the conditions of maximum discrimination but it is not even 
clear that there are such conditions. For example, the colour 
temperature of particular lighting conditions means that some differences 
are discriminable while others are not. If the colour temperature alters 
the originally discriminable differences become indiscriminable while the 
others become discriminable. It seems to be a sv/ings and roundabouts 
situation. Of course, just as in the furniture shop in the case of shape 
and talk of 'round tables', there are contexts in ordinary conversation 
where talk of 'real colours' is perfectly intelligible, e.g. the 'real 
colour' being the colour something appears in daylight as opposed to 
fluorescent light etc.
Now, once we have established that there is not any reason why a 
(2) material surface cannot be a number or range of colours the function of
the selective theory of the sense-organs, conditions, etc. is, as we have 
already noted, just to provide us with some means whereby some colours 
may be eliminated altogether, others may be filtered out to a degree 
and yet others are allowed to dominate. All this in a way which allows 
for variation in the composition of the colour we see. Hirst objects 
to the selective theory on the grounds that it is self contradictory to 
say that something is both green and blue. But, of course, our position 
is that it is not self contradictory and so this need not provide an
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obstacle to us in adopting the selective theory. He also objects that 
objects must be 'incredibly complex' if they are to possess a number or 
range of colours. But, again, our point just is that material surfaces 
are complex and that it ' is a mistake to regard them as being saturated 
with some single simple quality of the sort already indicated. Hirst, 
we can allow, is correct to say that it is not clear how the nervous 
system selects one out of a number of various shapes but the same point 
surely cannot be made with regard to colour. For it is surely clear 
enough that it is the nature of the nervous system etc. which limits our 
experience to certain types of object and prevents it being of another 
type of object, e.g. prevents it being experience of an X-ray type or 
whatever. We can leave further discussion of Hirst's objections to the 
selective theory to our discussion of the argument from causality and to 
the last chapter.
In concluding our discussion of the argument from ' colour variation' 
we should note that it is important to be able to give a direct surface 
realist account of colours as well as shapes. For, of course, if we 
admit that in normal experience the colours we experience are not on the 
surfaces of material objects but are something of a sense-data type 
(2) then all our visual experience would be of such a type and our best
efforts to get some direct realist account of shape would have been 
undermined. For, in the last resort, colour and shape are inseparable 
and so if the colour is a sense-datum then so too must be the shape. Ho 
one could ever see a totally colourless shape.
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The Arguments from Time and Causality
We come now to another sort of thought which may well lie behind
the notion that the objects of experience are never the material
objects which we commonly suppose. We are all familiar with the
phenomenon of seeing a man far off beating a drum and yet still hearing
the drumbeat when the drumstick is seen nowhere near the head of the
drum. This, so we are told, is because sound takes longer to reach us
than light. However, it is also held that light takes time to travel.
For example, it takes eight minutes for the light of the sun to reach
the earth. Again these observations prompt the thought that what we are
immediately aware of cannot possibly be the material objects which we
commonly suppose. For if I am looking at some object then what I
actually see is not that material object as it is at the precise time at
which I am looking. We get extreme cases of this in astronomy when we
can see stars which may not even exist anymore. Does it follow, however,
from the fact that at a later time t2 I see an object as it was at an
earlier time tl that I am not actually immediately aware of that object
at all? We naturally assume that we cannot have immediate experience of
a thing across a tract of time but are we correct in this assumption?
^2) . Speaking of this very point Chisholm remarks that 'we assume... that S
can perceive a at t only if a exists at t. If we combine this
assumption with what we know about the finite velocity of sound and
light, perhaps we can derive the conclusion that no one perceives any of
the things he thinks he perceives. But to assume that S can perceive a
at t only if a exists at t is no more reasonable than to assume that S
(l)can receive or reflect light from a at t only if a exists at t*'
We can agree with Chisholm that the assumption with regard to perception 
may well be unreasonable but not for the reason he cites. For, since
(I) See 6, p. 153.
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light takes time to travel it is perfectly easy to accept that S can 
receive light or reflect light from a at t even if a does not exist at 
t and yet feel that one cannot perceive, or be aware of, a at t if a 
does not exist at t. Indeed, it is precisely on this basis that the 
argument rests. Chisholm's treatment rests on assimilating the verb 
'perceive' to the verbs 'receive' and 'reflect' but it is doubtful if 
someone who appeals to the argument from time will accept that this 
assimilation is justified. Perhaps, however, we can find a way to 
undermine the assumption here if we consider time as analogous to space. 
We do not assume that because a thing is removed from us in space this, 
by itself, requires that our experience of that thing cannot be 
immediate. For example, it is not usually considered grounds for the 
conclusion that I am not (immediately) aware of a table that that table 
is a number of feet away from me. Similarly, might we not hold that 
removal in time does not constitute any reason for denying (immediate) 
awareness or experience. V/e would, then, claim that in looking at a 
star many light years away and which, by the time one looks at it, has 
ceased to exist the(immediate)object of one's experience is the star and 
not some sense-datum. The fact that the star is removed from one in 
(2) time, i.e. it may have ceased to exist many years ago, is no more
reason to deny it as an object of experience than the fact that it is 
removed from one in space. Of course, the choice of a star here is just 
to take one of the more vivid examples. Precisely the same arguments 
would apply to our experience of tables etc. for even then the light 
takes some time to travel from the table to the observer.
We now come to the argument from causality. Austin, in Sense and 
Sensibilia. never mentioned this sort of argument and Ayer's remark 
that 'it is rather surprising that Austin makes no attempt at all to
oo
114
measure the force of any such argument’ seems quite justified. This 
is especially so v/hen we consider that philosophical pre-occupation 
with the problems of epistemology seems to have been, to some extent at 
least, correlated with the growth of the essentially causal scientific 
outlook over the past three-hundred years or so. Indeed, it would seem 
probable that most laymen, when asked why it may be thought that the 
objects of our experience are of a sense-data type and never material 
objects, would answer, not in terms of the arguments from illusion, 
perspectival distortion, etc. but in terms of the argument from 
causality. Let us see, then, precisely what this argument amounts to.
Light is reflected from some external material object towards the 
eye of an observer. The lens of the eye focusses the light onto the 
retina of the eye and the retina changes the light energy into electrical 
energy. This electrical energy is then carried along nerves to the 
brain where electro-chemical activity takes place. From this it is 
concluded that the subject is really not aware at all of the initiating 
external material object but is really only ever aware of something 
nearer the opposite end of the causal 'chain', i.e. the penultimate item 
which we call the sense-datum. Whether individual philosophers prefer 
to call this penultimate item a brain-state or an idea is not really 
relevant for us here. Hirst says that it 'is natural to suppose that the 
generation of the sensory experience and its sensum occurs at the end of 
the causal chain which extends from the object to my brain by way of 
sense-organs and nerves'. Indeed, this would seem to be the case; it is 
certainly common. However, we must ask here if such a supposition is 
true. For we have already noted that while the sort of conclusion to 
which this supposition leads looks prima facie unexceptionable it brings 
in its wake the greatest problems. Do we accept the sense-datum theory
(I) See 5, p. 296.
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and all its attendant puzzles in order to preserve our science 
(remembering that one of the puzzles is itself how sense-datum'theory 
can ,V be,reconciled with a science based on what are initially assumed 
to be observations of ordinary material objects) or do we, at the cost 
of rejecting science, reject the sense-datum theory? Fortunately, I 
think that there is a way between the horns of this dilemma.
Let us start by considering the question ’How am I aware of the 
table?’ and its possible responses such as ’Because the light is on* or 
’Because my eyes are open’. Clearly, a vast number of responses could 
be made to this sort of question, each one specifying one of a vast 
number of conditions which have to be satisfied before I can be av/are of 
the table. The important thing to note here, however, is that, far from 
entailing the view that I am, after all:, not aware of the table at all, 
these sorts of responses presuppose that I am aware of the table. They 
are, after all, responses to the question ’How am I aware of the table?’, 
How, this suggests that the issue of. what one is aware of is a 
separable issue from that concerned with how one is aware. It does not 
follow from the fact that one is aware of the table because the light is 
on that what one is really aware of is the light. Similarly, it does 
(2) not seem to folio?/ from the fact that one is conscious because one has
a brain within which there is electro-chemical activity that one is 
really just conscious of one’s brain or its electro-chemical activity.
It does seem as if the argument from causality rests on a confusion of 
v/hat with how. We frequently want to answer the question ’ V/hat can you 
see?’ in terms of ordinary statements reporting the sighting of 
ordinary material objects. In answering the question ’How do you see 
X?’ we frequently want to answer in terms of such things as light, 
electrons, etc.
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But when things are set out this way we might wonder why anyone 
might ever be inclined to confuse the answers to ’What?’ with those to 
’How?’ and consequently conclude that the objects of experience cannot 
ever be the material objects which we commonly suppose. The answer to 
this lies in a certain picture of the world. The particular picture in 
question is that of a world that is essentially and fundamentally a 
complex of particles of more or less uniform type. These particles 
really provide the substance of the world. Material objects are composed 
of them and so is light, the lens of the eye, the retina and the brain 
etc. The particles of some material object initiate some movement which 
is communicated to the particles of light, this, in its turn, is 
communicated to the retina and so on until, at last, the subject gets 
its turn in the form of an experience only distantly related to the 
initiating material object.. It is this picture of the world as 
essentially and exclusively comprised of particles of more or less 
uniform type which form, quite literally, trains or chains from some 
external object to the subject which prompts the confusion of ?/hat with 
how. How, we need not here deny particle theories in general. We might 
admit particle theories so long as they allow entities of another type, 
and perhaps an epistemologically prior type, a place in the world, e.g. 
material objects. However, some may well feel inclined to attempt a 
reduction of talk about light particles, electrons, etc. into talk of 
observations of ordinary material objects, e.g. voltmeters etc. It 
certainly is not clear that lighii particles or electrons etc. are, at 
least in any ordinary sense, observable and this may add something to 
the plausibility of such a reduction. Presumably, such a reductionist 
would be inclined to regard particle theories as the products of the 
imagination which provide us with useful models, aids to the
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assimilation of causal data, but which, if taken as literally true, lead 
to difficulties. Such a reductionist would not be slow to point out 
that there are even areas in science itself where the value of the 
notion of a particle seems put severely to the test, e.g the ultimate 
nature of light, sub-atomic physics, etc. We can conclude, then, that 
we can accept all the causal sorts of statements found in ordinary and 
scientific talk without being committed to the sense-datum theory.
What we do reject is the rather simplistic picture of the world as 
essentially and exclusively comprised of such particles as we have 
indicated prompts the substitution of answers to ’What?’ with answers to 
'How?’. It might be suggested here, however, that we need look no 
further for an account of the confusion of what with ho?/ than the great 
prestige which modern science attracts. However, I am inclined to think 
that prestige by itself is hardly sufficient for such a confusion. For 
so long as people avoided the simplistic particle theory indicated 
they could attach to modern science all the prestige they wanted and 
confusion need not arise.
We have,/then, tried to show in this chapter that the principal 
arguments adduced in favour of the view that experience is never of 
(2) material objects fail. Further, we have also tried to show precisely
where and how they have gone wrong. In the case of shape ’variation* 
we noted that the argument rested on the mistaken notion that a 
judgement in terms of two-dimensional shape was appropriate to ordinary 
objects of experience. Similarly, in the case of colour ’variation’ we 
noted that the argument rested on the mistaken notion that a judgement 
in terms of colour, words taken to imply the presence of a simple, 
discrete, totally saturating and therefore excluding quality was 
appropriate to an ordinary material surface. The argument from time, we
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held, rested on the assumption that removal in time prohibits experience 
of an object but we saw no more reason to consider this assumption 
justified than the view that removal in space prohibits the experience 
of an object. Finally, we noted that the argument from causality did 
not arise out of causality per se but rather out of a rather simplistic 
notion regarding the ultimate nature of the world. However, loose ends 
remain and in the next and final chapter we shall try to tie up some of 
the more obvious ones.
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CHAPTER 7 COHCLHDIHG SPECULATIOHS AED CLARIFICATIONS 
The Nature of the Pure Subject
It takes no great thought to see the intimate connection between 
the simplistic particle theory and the generative theory of the sense- 
organs. On the selective theory v/e, as subjects, have, for at least 
much of the time, a clear view of material objects. On the generative 
theory we do not and our experience is really limited to changes at one 
end of the causal chain which are generated by other changes at the 
opposite end. Hirst argues that the generative theory is 'confirmed by 
the reproduction of such experiences in mental imagery (presumably 
because the appropriate brain activity recurs), by the sensations 
resulting from electrical stimulation of the brain'. Here, however, we 
must ask again why it should be thought to follow from the fact that 
certain experiences can be caused by stimulation via electrodes etc. 
that no experience is of material objects.
However, there is another point which may be made by the advocate 
of the generative theory. He may concede that there is a certain 
plausibility in saying, as we do on the selective theory, that we get a 
clear view through to material objects from the front of our eyes. But 
(2) he might remind us that behind the eyes are nerves, brain and other tissue.
He might then suggest that the subject resides somewhere around the 
brain or is conscious from somewhere around the brain, i.e. behind this 
mass of opaque tissue. He might then ask how it can be plausibly held 
that we, as subjects, can see directly through all this tissue to 
external material objects. Here we are led into the fascinating but 
profoundly difficult area of the nature of the pure subject. The first 
thing I think that we must note here is that it is not clear why it 
should be thought that the subject, even if it can be said to have any
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spatial position at all, should be thought to reside somewhere in the 
middle of one’s head. If v/e think of the nature of experience in a 
fairly common sort of way it seems clear that in normal sight we, as 
subjects, see from where our eyes are, hear from where our ears are, 
taste from where our tongues are and, perhaps most instructive of all, 
v/e feel with the entire surface of our bodies. The point being made here 
is that the subject cannot ordinarily be identified as something inside 
the head or as something experiencing from inside the head. Feeling a 
pain in my big toe is not like looking at a chair across the room. In 
feeling the pain I am not, as it were, up in my head feeling something 
sore about six feet away. The subject feels at the point of pain. All, 
then, v/e can do is mark a number of points from which the subject gets 
its experience of the world. It is, no doubt, because in the case of 
four out of five senses the relevant organs are placed on the head 
somewhere that we feel that the head must somehow provide the residence 
of the subject or the place from which it is conscious. If our eyes were 
on our big toes we would not feel this so much. What we can note, L
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however, is that the points from which it is possible to experience the 
world correlate, in a quite remarkable way, with the whole nervous 
(2) system. It is probably this sort of observation which lies behind
Wittgenstein’s remark that if anyone could draw a picture of the ’soul’ 
it would look like a drawing of the body. Also relevant here is 
Descartes’ observation that he is not lodged in his body like a pilot in 
a ship.
The advocate of the generative theory might, however, point out 
that whatever seem to be the places from which we experience the world 
what we know of experimental physiology establishes that the subject 
actually experiences things from ’further back along the causal chain’.
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The argument here v/ould seem to he that if you sever, say the optic 
nerve, which is behind the eye, blindness results and so the subject 
must see from behind the eye somewhere. Now we can certainly accept 
that blindness results from the severing of the optic nerves. However, 
we can ask how this, and similar evidence with regard to the rest of 
the nervous system, establishes that the subject is really aware from 
somewhere in the brain. How, precisely, does the view that I, as pure 
subject, am really hware from inside my brain follow from the fact that 
it is a condition of my seeing some external object that my optic 
nerves are intact and other similar conditions? It might seem to follow 
if we made the same sort of mistake which we earlier noted in 
connection with the arguments that the objects of experience are really 
brain states etc. There, we noted, the object of experience was 
confused with one of the causal conditions of experience. Here a 
similar confusion seems to have arisen between the subject of experience 
and a condition of experience or, at least, the locality of that 
condition, i.e. inside one's head, and the locality of the place from which 
the subject is aware which is also alleged to be inside one's head. We 
can similarly conclude, then, that it does not follow from any fact of 
Q  experimental physiology that the subject is aware from somewhere inside
the head. It only follows from such facts that it is a causal condition 
of a subject having experiences that certain conditions with regard to 
the inside of the head are satisfied. We would, then, hold that our 
selective theory also survives these particular objections.
Let us now turn to a thought which might be prompted by the 
observation, already made, that a quite remarkable correlation exists 
between the points from which it is possible to experience the world and 
. the nervous system. Might it not be that the pure subject, as we have
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been calling it, is identical with the nervous system? This question, 
in what seems to be the confused formulation of the mind/body problem, 
has been one of the most intransigent of all philosophical problems and 
it is not one which we can go into at any length here. However, if we 
just glance at it in terms of the subject and nervous system we may get 
a clue as to the cause of its intransigence.
The crucial thing to remember here is that the pure subject was 
originally conceived simply as the logical product of the form of 
experience, i.e. not as a thing with any empirical content whatsoever.
We, like Hume, introspected in vain. Now this straightaway puts our 
problem in a fresh light for it turns out that we are asking ourselves 
if this ppre subject, something devoid of any empirical content, is 
identical with a content, or possible content, of experience, i.e. the 
nervous system. But put this way is it not clear that this is a 
question which could have no resolution one way or the other? For how 
could one begin to establish an identity or, for that matter, a 
distinction between the subject, which has absolutely no empirical 
content, i.e. nothing to provide evidence one way or the other, with a 
content or possible content of experience? Given the nature of the 
subject it is necessarily impossible to identify it with any content of 
experience.
Hovrever, it might be asked, ’Although we began with the concept 
of the subject as something without any empirical content can we not 
now, via reflection on the nature of experience, give it some 
empirical content in terms of the places from which the world is 
experienced? Might we not just say that the subject is at the places 
from which it is experiencing things, i.e. points on the nervous system?’ 
In order to answer this we must dwell a little further on the nature of
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experience. Normally, when v/e are fully awake we are aware from the 
eyes, ears, tongue, nose and tactually and kinaesthetically aware with 
virtually the whole of the body. If we accept the suggestion under 
consideration it would then be said that the subject occupies more or 
less just that space occupied by the body. However, it would be possible, 
via anaesthetics, to obliterate all tactile and kinaesthetic sensation 
while leaving all other sensations alone. Now the subject, according to 
our suggestion, would not occupy the whole body but six quite discrete 
areas, i.e. the two eyes, the two ears, the nose and the tongue. Now, 
if we want to maintain that the subject is actually at the places from 
which it is experiencing the world v/e have to say now that it is in six 
different places at once and nowhere in between those places. But now 
the question arises ’How can the subject, i.e. a single thing, which is, 
ex hypothesi, capable of spatial position be in six quite different 
places at once but nowhere in between those places?!. It is hard to find 
any sensible answer to this question and so we can conclude that, as we 
at first suspected, the pure subject cannot itself be given any spatial 
position although it remains quite in order to identify places from which 
it is aware. A similar point can be made in terms of time. A subject 
^2^ cannot be said to occupy temporal position any more than it can be said
. to occupy a spatial one. However, it can experience from discrete 
temporal points, i.e. times separated by periods of total unconsciousness, 
e.g. sleeping, just as it can experience from discrete spacial ones.
This is important for it gives us a way of distinguishing subjects one 
from the other and resisting the pull towards an impersonal subject of 
the Kantian kind. For example, I am the subject which sees the world 
from here now and you are the subject which sees the world from there 
now. The subject itself, however, remains totally devoid of empirical
oo
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content and, consequently, not a candidate for identification with any 
empirical content whatsoever. The attempt at such an identification, or 
even at the distinction, is an attempt, not unknown in philosophy, to 
transcend experience and the consequence is a perplexing confusion of a 
typically philosophical kind. Whether the subject and the nervous 
system, or any other empirical item, are identical or distinct is not a 
real issue. For the subject is necessarily devoid of any empirical 
content.
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Kant•s Trans cendentai * I’
We have just mentioned the subject as something which itself is 
necessarily devoid of any empirical content whatsoever and throughout 
the dissertation, since we first introduced it in our discussion of the 
concept of experience, the notion of a pure subject has borne 
considerable weight. From time to time, hov/ever, we have also spoken of 
Kant’s notion of the transcendental self and in these places we have 
adopted a rather cool, non-committal tone. Some may have felt a tension 
here which we must now try to relax.
The crucial point here is that while our pure subject and the Kantian 
transcendental self are both transcendental insofar as neither is a 
possible empirical content they are not to be identified. Such a 
mistaken identification is prompted by the rather simplistic, dualistic 
distinction between the ’transcendental self’ and the ’empirical self’.
For it is thought, if our personal self or subject is not the empirical 
one then it must be the transcendental one and there is an end to it. 
However, it is frequently noted that Kant’s use of the personal 
expression ’the transcendental self’ is misleading and that his meaning 
would be better cought by the use of the impersonal expression ’one’ or 
(2) ’consciousness in general’ etc. Thus Kant’s transcendental self is not
any particular personal subject and he is, consequently, able to claim 
that all experiences belong to the transcendental self without 
committing obvious falsehood. We have, then, a distinction between the 
transcendental impersonal self of Kant and our non-empirical particular 
or personal subjects of experience and a further distinction between 
these and empirical selves which, whatever they are, must be empirical 
contents or objects of experience. We have then three items and not 
just two. First, we have the Kantian transcendental self, i.e.
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consciousness in general, which has all experience. Second, we have 
our particular personal subjects of experience each of which has only 
some experience. Third, we have an empirical self which must, 
somehow, he an object of experience. Here we might have in mind, as 
well as the body, behavioural characteristics and thoughts and desires 
etc, of which the personal subject is conscious. It might be argued that 
since neither the Kantian transcendental self nor our pure personal 
subject have any empirical content whatsoever there cannot possibly be 
any basis for distinguishing them. However, while we have just noted 
that it does not seem correct to attribute to the personal subject itself 
any spacial or temporal position it does seem possible to say that it 
sees from such and such a place at such and such a time. This gives us, 
as we have also noted, a way of distinguishing pure personal subjects 
one from the other and, consequently, also a way of distinguishing the 
notion of a pure personal subject from the Kantian notion of the 
transcendental self.
Perhaps this is the time to note very briefly a role played by the
transcendental self in Kant’s philosophy for it seems quite pertinent to
the topic of solipsism. For certain features of Kant’s philosophy have
(22 a strong solipsistic pull and part of the function of the transcendental
self is to resist this pull. A fundamental feature of Kant’s philosophy
is his view that contradictions reside in the common supposition that
space and time are objective realities which exist outside and quite
independent of mind. Kant claimed to have shown these contradictions
Cl')
clearly in the ’Antinomy of Pure Reason’  ^ 'and he concluded that space 
and time cannot be objectively real but must rather be subjective forms 
inhering in ’the subject' and within which experience is presented. As 
Kant writes space and time are ’in us, prior to experience' and ’the 
(I) See 15.
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subject in which the representation of time has its original ground*. 
Consequently, insofar as the objects of experience, e.g. material objects, 
are spatio-temporal entities they too must be, in some sense, subjective.
The solipsistic tendency of this viev/^  of normal material objects 
or phenomena as being subjective seems clear enough. For if such 
spatio-temporal objects are subjective and there were no impersonal mind 
or subject of the sort represented by Kant’s transcendental self but 
only discrete personal subjects then it might well seem that each such 
subject will inhabit its own discrete spatio-temporal world. Again, if, 
at this point, we introduce the notion that the limits of sense are 
provided by the limits of experience then there does not, for such a 
subject, seem to be sense to talk and thought of other spatio-temporal 
worlds, each with its ovm supporting subject. We seem to be back with 
metaphysical solipsism.
Since, hov/ever, Kant does maintain his transcendental self it 
becomes possible for him to resist this pull and claim that while 
phenomena are subjective they do not inhere in any particular personal 
subject but simply in the transcendental self, i.e. consciousness in 
general. Indeed, in his refutation of idealism Kant explicitly holds 
(22 that phenomena must be independent of particular knowing individuals.
However, what, precisely, the notion of the transcendental self or 
consciousness in general amounts to is not so clear. It cannot simply 
be an aggregate of individual subjects for, as we have suggested, such 
an aggregate would seem capable of sustaining a number of private 
phenomenal worlds. For some omniscient, transcendent being these 
worlds may well form a pattern in which he could see mirrored the 
noumenal world of Kantian things in themselves which remained hidden 
behind human experience. However, for.a truly.public, yet ultimately 
(I) See 15.
o128
subjective or transcendentally ideal world in which numbers of 
individual, knowing human subjects can share we need more than just 
numbers of such subjects. With this in mind the transcendental self of 
Kant must be something more like Berkeley's God or the Absolute of 
post-Kantian German Idealism. This is, perhaps, a less immediately 
engaging prospect.
It might be wondered if we could not find some compromise position 
between the objectivity and subjectivity of time and space by talking 
of the intersubjectivity of time and space. The spatio-temporal 
world which depends on my mind might be held to 'converge' in some way 
with the worlds of other subjects. One problem here, however, lies in 
giving much content to the notion of convergence, and its correlative 
notion of divergence, in the absence of time and space. A further 
problem would seem to involve the notion of intersubjectivity itself. 
Despite the fact that the notion is made to bear a considerable amount 
of weight in some contemporary philosophy at this level, at which our 
concern is with the essential and fundamental nature of experience, it 
begins to look like straightforward subjectivity thinly disguised in 
an attempt to avoid the absurdity into which straightforward 
(22 subjectivism leads.
Fortunately, we need not now feel ourselves forced to admit the 
Kantian transcendental self in an attempt to avoid solipsism for it is
Vnow generally agreed^ 'that Kant was mistaken in thinking that space and 
time, conceived as objective realities, did indeed involve inherent 
contradictions. Consequently, if, in accord with this, we reject the 
requirement that spatio-temporal objects of experience must be 
subjective certain features of Kant's philosophy which remain, i.e. his 
view that at least some experience must be experience of spatio-temporal 
(I) See 24, p. 7.
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objects enjoying a. sustained existence independent of any particular
knov/ing subject, collapse back into a view close to the common
suppositions with which we began our dissertation. If, on the other
hand, we cling to the subjectivity requirement but reject the notion of
the transcendental self then, as we have seen, v/e seem to collapse back
in the opposite direction into solipsism. These two opposite tendencies
seem to account for much of the richness and complexity of the Kantian
tradition as it passes through Schopenhauer into the early Wittgenstein.
(l)And that, of course, is the Wittgenstein who, as we already noted^ 
seemed to be the target for the later Wittgenstein's remark that the 
'solipsist*, as he called him, did not deny any empirical reality but 
simply required a nevi notation.
We can now conclude our discussion with a brief review. We began 
by noting that certain considerations are sometimes taken to establish 
that experience is never of material objects as commonly supposed but of 
other things referred to as sense-data. We then noted that, when 
coupled with empiricist theses regarding the limits of knowledge and 
sense, this sense-data thesis seemed to lead to quite dramatic 
challenges to common belief in the forms of what we called 'epistemological 
(22 solipsism* and 'metaphysical solipsism*, However, we also allowed that
many philosophers have claimed the sense-data thesis to be quite 
reconcilable with common belief. Principal among these were 
representative realists and phenomenalists. For the purposes of this 
dissertation we accepted that the empiricist theses of knowledge:and 
sense, roughly stated as they were, had some essential core of truth to 
them and our principal concern was with the sense-data thesis and some 
intimately related notions.
We then attempted, by means of discussion of the notions of
(l) See above p. 57*
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experience, sense-data, material objects and sensibilia, to clarify the 
issues which, so far, had only been roughly indicated. In the course 
of this conceptual clarification we introduced a distinction between 
what we called 'experience* on the one hand and, on the other, 
conceptualization, judgement, belief and knowledge etc. This was a 
distinction to which we had reason to return a number of times in the 
course of the dissertation. We also here found our concerns expanding 
to cover the notion of sensibilia. We then noted that the arguments 
in favour of the view that experience is specifically of sense-data 
themselves required that the sense-data thesis be reconciled with common 
belief about the world. We then argued that neither representative 
realism nor phenomenalism seemed at all convincing in their attempts to 
reconcile the sense-data thesis with common belief and that the thesis 
that experience is of sensibilia seemed to be no more satisfactory.
We discussed tv/o of the most celebrated treatments of issues which 
seemed relevant to us, Wittgenstein's treatment of the sense-data 
thesis in the private language argument and Professor Strawson's, views 
on the conditions necessary for the ascription of predicates as they 
bear on the issue of solipsism. We did not find either of these 
treatments ultimately convincing. However, we did note that there 
seemed to be some internal incoherence, at least in the case of the 
metaphysical solipsist.
Eventually, in view of the difficulties into which the theses of 
sense-data and sensibilia, when coupled with our empiricist views of 
knowledge and sense, seemed to lead, we submitted to a thorough 
examination the reasons normally adduced in favour of the general view 
that experience is never of material objects as we might commonly think. 
First, we had reason, once again, to return to our distinction between
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experience and conceptualization, knowledge, etc, in order to show, 
both with reference to Descartes and Ayer, that nothing really follows 
about the nature of the objects of experience from the limits of human 
knowledge. It was, therefore, a mistake to think that the thesis that 
experience was not of material objects could be straighforwardly 
established from certain sceptical claims with regard to knowledge. It 
did seem, however, that there were' more promising reasons' for'-thinking that 
experience was never of material objects as commonly thought. Relevant 
here were the arguments from, so-called, ’perceptual variation', the 
argument from time and the argument from causality. None of these, 
however, were found to be finally convincing and we concluded that all 
the phenomena which gave rise to them can be accounted for in a way which 
does not commit us to denying the common belief that we are frequently 
aware of the surfaces of material objects. In this way, by rejecting 
the general thesis that experience is never of material objects, we 
closed both the specific sense-data route to solipsism and the route to 
other problems prompted by the sensibilia thesis. And indeed, although - 
we did continue with a brief discussion of the nature of the subject of 
experience, our principal conclusion was that the objects of experience 
(22 are, for most of the time at least, material objects.
O
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